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INGO PROFITEERING OR REAL OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY? 
 A critical space exists within the contemporary literature surrounding those 
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) involved with the response and 
recovery efforts that follow catastrophic events. Specifically, that gap includes the 
efficacy of the aid efforts that take place after these destabilizing events. Ramachandran 
and Walz (2012) outline this debate with their review of the American Red Cross (ARC) 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 
 Ramachandran and Walz’s (2012) research examines the flow of relief aid to 
INGOS, through a policy analyst lens. Their research focuses on systematic problems and 
suggests that these organizations need to improve levels of transparency, accountability, 
and oversight of disaster recovery projects. Specifically, they target the absence of 
external reviews of INGO funded programs. In the case of Haiti, they suggest that the 
lack of external oversight allowed a significant amount of funds to flow through INGOs 
and into a host of “private sub-contractors inside the Beltway (Ramachandran and Walz 
2012:13). 
Their analysis provides a historical and contextual overview of the state of Haiti 
before the 2010 earthquake, first by addressing the impoverished Haitian population, the 
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heightened levels of political corruption, and critically the failed diplomatic relations with 
the United States, and broader international community. This lack of international ties 
results from a decades-old dependence on foreign aid that began in the 1960s. Because of 
pervasive levels of corruption, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and INGOs were 
established as intermediaries rather than route the aid directly to the Haitian government 
(Ramachandran and Walz 2010). The aid that flowed through INGOs essentially created 
a “parallel quasi-government” that with time became stronger than the Haitian 
government itself (Ramachandran and Walz 2012:37). 
  Ramachandran and Walz (2010) concluded that the bypassing of the Haitian 
government weakened the capacity of the nation and more importantly pulled in skilled 
foreign labor to the private sector. Because of a high level of imported labor, only small 
amounts of wage compensation remained local and supported the internal Haitian 
economy. In addition to the lack of economic multipliers, the authors also targeted INGO 
problems associated with transparency, accountability, and available public program data. 
They highlighted groups’ high levels of overhead and fees, the conflicts between external 
donor goals, and private Haitian interests (Ramachandran and Walz 2012). In the end, 
their research suggests three policy recommendations for INGOs: 1) systematic 
evaluations of implemented programs; 2) use of International Aid Transparency Aid 
Initiative (IATI) transparency standards for financial and program data; and 3) new 
procurement practices for resource bidding and capacity building within the nation. 
 Ramachandran and Walz (2012) are not alone in their criticism of ARC recovery 
efforts. Recent journalistic accounts - Elliott, Eisinger and Sullivan (2014) and Elliott and 
Sullivan (2015) - pillory ARC’s fundraising practices and its disaster recovery programs. 
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These reporters likewise found the actions of relief organizations wanting. Their articles 
tend to focus on the prevalence of INGO profiteering motives, the general lack of 
accountability within those efforts, and a lack of financial transparency. 
 In 2015 the authors analyzed ARC’s response and recovery effort for the 2010 
Haiti earthquake with a similar focus on funds raised and victims’ unmet needs. In Haiti, 
the authors focused specifically on the longer-term response within the housing sector 
(i.e., the theme of this thesis). The authors indicate one of the primary recovery goals of 
the ARC in Haiti was building permanent homes and neighborhoods following the quake. 
Through its donor networks and other fundraising efforts, ARC raised approximately 
$488 million dollars for Haitian recovery programs. ARC reporting indicates that they 
built 130,000 homes in Haiti. However, Elliott and Sullivan (2015) claim that only six 
homes could be associated with ARC programs.  
 Numerous reasons were cited by the authors for this failure, including 1) language 
barriers; 2) the inability to identify and obtain land to construct homes; and 3) the lack of 
expertise operating in a failed state riddled with corrupt practices. In addition to these 
fundamental dilemmas, ARC struggled to find the local social capital necessary for the 
sustainable housing recovery (Elliott and Sullivan 2015). The authors conclude that ARC 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Gail McGovern utilized the Haiti earthquake as a 
“spectacular fundraising opportunity” (Elliott and Sullivan 2015:15). They claim 
McGovern’s motivation was to repair the financial mismanagement of the previous ARC 
administration. In effect, it is claimed that she attempted to return the ARC to its original 
congressional mandate of effective humanitarian relief but failed to deliver needed 
support for immediate response and long-term recovery efforts. This practice is 
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commonly referred to as INGO’s profiteering from a catastrophic event. In the instance 
of Haiti, the ARC allegedly faced a severe financial deficit and potentially used this 
disaster to generate liquidity while failing to deliver on its duties in response and 
recovery (Elliott and Sullivan 2015).  
 Although media accounts offer sensational accounts of ARC efforts in Haiti, they 
tend to underestimate the potential problems of operating in a context like Haiti. The 
question of INGO efficacy is very much a quandary. The literature varies in orientation 
from academic to journalistic, and it provides a prodigious number of successes and 
failures of INGOs in Haiti and across the world.  
The successes in Haiti involve the day-to-day services provided by NGOs and 
INGOs, as well as the homes reconstructed by another group – Mission of Hope Haiti, a 
small NGO located in Florida. The Mission of Hope Haiti was successful in home 
reconstruction in Haiti at a reduced cost (C. McQuilkin, personal communication, 
September 30, 2015).  
In contrast, by late 2011 ARC had embarked on a plan to construct new homes in 
the Haiti neighborhood of Carrefour-Feuilles. The vision of the ARC (2011) was to 
provide approximately 13,000 homes with nearly one-half million dollars of their donor 
fundraising efforts. ARC apparently was not successful in securing the land to reconstruct 
homes and this program subsequently failed. The nearly one-half million dollars in donor 
funds allegedly were transferred to other groups to continue the reconstruction work, 
which was never completed. 
With these conflicting perspectives on INGO recovery efforts in mind, this thesis 
is concerned with the efficacy of INGO actors within catastrophic level disaster settings. 
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These massive scale events present enormous challenges for those organizations charged 
with the extended aspects of recovery. When those challenges are encumbered by chaotic 
(economic) institutional environments, such as those found in Haiti, clearly it raises the 
difficulty of response and recovery exponentially. 
Clearly, one must be aware of the institutional frameworks (North 1992) – human 
derived rules and procedures – that are found in these settings; they play an essential role 
in recovery. An absence of a functioning economic framework, as can be found in Haiti, 
does not provide the structure necessary for adequate recovery. In some sense, it may be 
that INGOs are simply hamstrung by the lack of an effective institutional structure in 
some contexts, and it may be beyond the scope of any outside organization to effectively 
produce the desired recovery from these events. In other words, it may simply be asking 
too much for any organization to find success in these settings no matter how well they 
are run. 
Along those lines, I am interested in whether, or not, if these charges of INGO 
profiteering represent legitimate views of real problems. In particular, I am pursuing the 
following research question: 
Given the institutional challenges and the failed state context of Haiti, were INGO 
housing recovery efforts associated with the 2010 earthquake efficacious? 
To answer this question, I am going to utilize a comparative research design that looks at 
the housing recovery efforts of two INGOS (i.e., ARC and Disaster Emergency 
Committee) within two separate catastrophic events (i.e., Haiti’s 2010 earthquake and the 
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami). 
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Using this comparative leverage, I find that INGOs who develop local stakeholder 
trust and rapport, as well as partner with local host government’s and local NGOs are 
efficacious in the recovery efforts. Regardless of a failed or conflict state – Banda Aceh. 
To the contrary, INGOs who do not develop local stakeholder trust and rapport, nor 
partner with the local host government and local NGOs are not efficacious. The failure of 
the INGOs to recognize the socio-economic and political environment before establishing 
their self-developed agenda for recovery is a failure point for the INGO before they every 
begin recovery efforts. This is regardless of how successful their relief efforts were in the 
response phase – Haiti. 
 
THE HAITIAN CONTEXT AND THE 2010 EARTHQUAKE 
 The Republic of Haiti occupies the western portion of the island of Hispaniola - a 
part of the Greater Antilles Islands located in the Caribbean Sea (see, Figure 1.1). Haiti 
borders the Atlantic Ocean to the north and the Dominican Republic to the east. To the 
south, lies the Caribbean Sea and the Windward Passage, and the Gulf of Gonâve 
comprises the eastern border (United Nations Secretariat 2013; Central Intelligence 
Agency 2013). The island is part of the Antilles island arc that wraps around the 
Caribbean plate from Cuba to Curacao (Bakun, Flores, and ten Brink 2012:19). It 
comprises approximately 27,750 square miles of land, which is slightly smaller than the 
state of Maryland in the United States. The island has approximately 1,100 miles of 
coastline and is roughly 700 nautical miles from Miami, Florida (Hadden and Minson 
2010). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE] 
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In the midst of huge riots against slavery, Haiti declared its independence from 
the French colonial empire on January 1st, 1804. It became the first black republic in the 
Caribbean region, but unfortunately, the violence and chaos of its origins have endured 
with time. It has an extensive legacy of coercive state violence and political corruption 
and has experienced some popular uprisings and regime changes (Lundy 2011; Jobe 
2011). This broad reach of corruption and the lack of emergency response capacity would 
both be significant factors in the failure of Haiti to prepare and respond to the 2010 quake 
(Lundy 2011). Haiti, in fact, is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. It is the 
only country in the Americas on the United Nations Lesser Developed Countries (LDC) 
list, and it has continuously failed to sustain economic recovery and stabilization 
(Margeson and Taft-Morales 2010; Hou and Shi 2011; United Nations 2013). 
At the time of the 2010 earthquake, the estimated population of Haiti was over ten 
million inhabitants, with approximately two million residing in the capital of Porta au 
Prince. The population density estimate for the country is 140.9 persons per square mile 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2013) indicative of closely built housing and the limited 
amount of land available for construction. The capital city, Port-au-Prince, is the 
economic hub of the country accounting for “65% of Haiti’s total business and 85% of 
Haiti’s tax revenues” (Hou and Shi 2011:2). 
Haiti derives its name from the word Arawak or place name “Ayti” meaning 
mountainous land (Hadden and Minson 2010:3). It is, in fact, a rough and mountainous 
part of the Island of Hispaniola and it possesses an irregular coastline. There are only a 
few plains located on that end of the island, and the majority of the country’s population 
congregates within those areas creating a dense context of overpopulation (Hadden and 
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Minson 2010). These flat lands also are valuable for agricultural uses making them 
valuable for purposes other than housing, with coffee being the major cash crop (Hadden 
and Minson 2010:8). One of these Haitian regions is particularly isolated – the Central 
Plateau. The Central Plateau's hard to reach as it is approximately 1,000 feet above sea 
level and bordered by two minor mountain ranges, Cahos and Noires Mountains (Hadden 
and Minson 2010). 
In total, four main mountain ranges rise from the island, with nearly two-thirds of 
the total Haitian portion of Hispaniola located 1,600 feet above sea level (Hadden and 
Minson 2010). The northernmost mountain range is Cordillera Septentrional (as it is 
known in the Dominican Republic) only occupies space on Tortue Island in Haiti. The 
second range is Massif du Nord (Northern Massif) and rises to heights of 4,000 feet 
above sea level. The third mountain range is Matheux Mountains (Chaine des Matheux) 
and occupies the west-central portion of Haiti. The Trou d’Eau Mountains (Chaine du 
Trou d’Eau) are located further east from the Matheux mountains near the capital city of 
Port au Prince. The fourth mountain range is the Massif de la Selle (Hadden and Minson 
2010). 
The primary output of the Haitian economy is agriculture, with nearly 40% of the 
inhabitants engaged in farming activities (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Haiti has a 
centuries-long history of rice production, but its surplus export economy was threatened 
in the 1970s. At that time, a series of international embargoes and naval blockades 
choked off Haiti’s agricultural export business (Jobe 2011). During a series of economic 
embargoes, the people of Haiti became more and more dependent on foreign aid (e.g. 
Haiti imports 60% of its food supply from other regions of the world (Jobe 2011). Today, 
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the leading economic industry is clothing manufacturing and accounts for 90% of the 
country’s exports (Margeson and Taft-Morales 2010). 
The Haitian Natural Risk Profile 
Given its Caribbean location and challenging geography, Haiti is vulnerable to 
multiple natural hazards – most critically hurricanes and geological events. The top ten 
natural disasters affecting Haiti, between 1900 and 2008, were typically earthquakes and 
tropical storms. Tropical storms clearly are Haiti’s number one hazard, but earthquakes 
are a close second because of the instability of the plates in this region (Margeson and 
Taft-Morales 2010). The only other Haitian catastrophe listed in the top ten was the 
cholera outbreak of October 2010 (EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster 
Database 2013). Over 96% of the population is exposed to one or both risks, and these 
events have wide scale impacts (DesRoaches n.d.) Natural disasters, catastrophes, as well 
as deforestation of the land all have considerable effects on the lives of its inhabitants. 
In short, the Haitian people, who already live under a failed state of government, 
are also subject to a near constant threat of natural disaster. Throughout Haiti’s history, a 
disaster event occurs nearly every year, and a major disaster or catastrophe occurs once 
every five years (United Nations 2011). Examples of such events include Hurricane 
George in 1998 that destroyed 80% of Haiti’s crops. Tropical Storm Jeanne in 2004 
which killed 1,900 by direct storm effect and an additional 2,600 Haitians from flooding. 
The worst year, by far, was 2008 when three hurricanes (i.e. Gustav, Hanna, and Ike) and 
a tropical storm (i.e. Faye) struck the island. During that repeated affront, the island 
sustained over one billion dollars in damage, which would account for 15% of Haiti’s 
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annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That level of loss exacerbates the challenges of 
living with an economy that already was in shambles (IFRC 2010). 
The Catastrophic Shock 
In 2010, over 80% of Haitians lived below the poverty level with 54% living in 
extreme poverty (i.e. living on less than $1.25 per day) (Central Intelligence Agency 
2011). However, Haiti was making progress on multiple fronts before the 2010 quake. 
The United Nations (U.N.) had been in the country since 2004 assisting Haiti on multiple 
fronts. Specifically, U.N. personnel were working on security and stability, political 
processes, and human rights issues (Margeson and Taft-Morales 2010). The World Bank 
has also been assisting Haiti’s government on financial matters and development of a 
comprehensive emergency response plan. The goal was to focus on disaster risk 
management and to created an effective response strategy that concentrated on the routine 
threats of tropical storms. 
On Tuesday, January 12, 2010, at approximately 3:53 p.m. Central Standard Time 
(CST), a 7.0 Richter Scale magnitude earthquake struck the Republic of Haiti (see, Figure 
1.2). The initial quake lasted approximately 35 seconds, with significant energy delivered 
over a 15-second period of that span. Roughly seven minutes later, a second earthquake 
measuring 6.0 magnitude further disturbed the island nation. Over the next several days 
another 80 aftershocks, greater than 4.5 magnitudes would keep the tectonic region of 
Haiti destabilized (Margeson and Taft-Morales 2010). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Seismologists suggest that these earthquakes and aftershocks occurred along the 
north Hispaniola and east-west oriented Septentrional and Enriquillo-Plantain Garden 
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(EPGFZ) fault systems rather than on the Enriquillo fault zone (Hou and Shi 2011; 
Bakun, Flores, and ten Brink 2012; Fritz et. al 2012). The root source of the quakes was a 
reverse left-lateral strike slip fault of the Caribbean and North American tectonic plates 
(see, Figure 1.3) (Hou and Shi 2011; Bakun, Flores, and ten Brink 2012; Fritz et al. 
2012). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.3 ABOUT HERE] 
 The earthquake epicenter was approximately 15 miles south-southwest of the 
capital city Porta-au-Prince, Haiti. The earthquake was shallow which allowed more 
surface energy dissipation when compared to a deeper quake (United States Geological 
Survey 2010; Hou and Shi 2011). Historically, the 2010 Haiti earthquake measured as the 
strongest earthquake to affect Haiti since two earthquakes struck the country in the 
1700’s (Arbon 2010; Fritz et al. 2012). 
The Resulting Damage of the Quake 
 In contrast to the history of destructive earthquakes within this region, the 2010 
Haiti earthquake 7.0 value ranks as the smallest regarding raw magnitude. The magnitude 
of earthquakes is evaluated by the Richter scale standard (Hou and Shi 2011), which was 
derived from the research of American Geologist Charles F. Richter. Richter provided an 
open-ended, logarithmic scale for measuring earthquake magnitude as waves on a 
seismograph (see, Figure 1.4). As the extent of his level increases, there is an upward 
magnitude increase by an exponential factor of ten (Hou and Shi 2011). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1.4 ABOUT HERE] 
Despite the average rank of this event on the scale, it is associated with the 
highest loss of life and it acted to damage more of the built environment than any other 
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7.0 magnitude earthquake in history (see, Figure 1.5) (Hou and Shi 2011). The capital 
city of Port-au-Prince suffered near complete devastation (see, Figure 1.6) creating a 
historical catastrophe (United States Geological Survey 2015). 
[INSERT FIGURES 1.5 AND 1.6 ABOUT HERE] 
  The total damage estimate in Haiti was $7,804,000,000 (USD) equating to 120% 
of the 2009 Haiti GDP (Special Envoy to Haiti 2012). The breakdown of the total damage 
consists of $4,300,000 (USD) in direct damages and $3,500,000 (USD) in economic losses. 
The damage estimated to the housing sector alone is valued at $2,333,200,000 USD. An 
additional $739,000,000 (USD) was for emergency and temporary sheltering needs for 
approximately 2.3 million internally displaced people (IDPs), including 302,000 homeless 
children (IFRC 2010). As of December 2015, 59,720 Haitians remain displaced 
representing approximately 14,679 households (International Organization for Migration 
2015). 
 
CATASTROPHE AND THE FAILED STATE OF HAITI 
 Failed states, or those areas that lack functioning social contracts or systems of 
governance, present extreme challenges in the wake of such disaster events. As Cliff and 
Luckham (1999:27) suggest: “humanitarian assistance may have to contend with a 
fractured, ineffective, or nonexistent state” and “part of post-conflict recovery will 
involve reconstituting the state.” Buss and Gardner (2008) describe Haiti as a such a state 
and the bilateral and multilateral donor community certainly share this perspective. The 
Haitian failed state clearly placed extreme demands on the INGOs that responded to this 
particular catastrophe. 
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 Natsios (1995) describes five symptoms of those complex humanitarian 
emergencies (CHEs) found in failed and conflict states. He suggests that: 1) the 
community will have a government incapable of providing essential services to the nation 
due to complete governmental and social service collapse; 2) the state of conflict will 
lead to violent and potentially fatal human rights violations; 3) the society will have an 
inability to secure a requisite food supply; 4) the event will acerbate levels of economic 
collapse and introduce problems of hyperinflation and further unemployment of the 
country’s populace; and 5) the country is likely to exhibit mass migrations of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) searching for food and fleeing conflict. Haiti would experience 
each of these symptoms and to date has not found an effective long-term treatment. 
This, of course, is a problem of political context. The politics of corruption found within 
the Haitian government has been an issue for over half a century (Lundy 2011; Jobe 
2011; United Nations 2011). The country has experienced multiple coup d'états and 
repetitious regime changes. Haiti’s failed state and dependence on foreign aid are a 
decades-old phenomenon, and they would prove to be a significant obstacle to those 
INGOs charged with response and recovery responsibilities for the 2010 earthquake 
catastrophe. This thesis seeks to systematically evaluate whether or not the activities 
engaged in by these groups were consistent with the profiteering charges that have been 
laid against them, or whether the failed state environment limited these organizations in 
ways that other organizations would have exhibited similar failures.  
14 
 
Figure 1.1 – Topographical Haiti map–Western nation on Hispaniola. (Maps of the World 2014)   
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Figure 1.2 – 2010 Haiti earthquake populace affected (Ramchandran and Walz 2012)  
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Figure 1.3 – Left lateral strike-slip fault / Reverse Fault, 2010 Haiti quake (USGS 2010)  
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Figure 1.4 – 2010 Haiti earthquake damage (ABC News 2010)  
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Figure 1.5 – Damage in Port-au-Prince Haiti following the 2010 earthquake (Millstein 2010)  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 
CATASTROPHES ARE NOT JUST BIGGER DISASTERS 
 In Chapter I, I reviewed the 2010 Haiti earthquake and depicted it as a 
catastrophic event based upon a specific set of criteria established within the literature. 
While not specifically mentioned, the quake inherently caused significant losses and 
damage across critical sectors, including government, first response, public infrastructure, 
housing, and livelihoods. Catastrophes are unique and produce various levels of damage 
and the recovery results based on the specific impact risk (United Nations 2011). 
Compounding the catastrophic implications in Haiti were the pre-existing poverty levels, 
political corruption, and the failed state context among other variables. The failed state 
environment did not allow Haiti to respond to the needs of its citizens, leaving the 
response and recovery to the international community and many INGOs. Unfortunately, 
allegations of profiteering were made against some of these INGOS by several sources, 
potentially slowing the assistance and recovery processes. Tierney and Oliver-Smith 
(2012) elucidate catastrophes provide complex and challenging environments for those 
involved in response and recovery. To better understand the recovery efforts of Haiti’s 
catastrophe through a systematic approach that is based on research literature, I will 
develop a recovery analysis framework in this chapter.  
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Do Definitions and Elements of Catastrophe Matter? 
 A hazard and risk analysis provides a trifurcated scale of events with which 
emergency managers can organize their responses to these events. The scale starts with 1) 
routine emergencies, which are regular day-to- day calls for service for emergency 
response agencies requiring no outside assistance; 2) disasters that affect a localized 
geographic area and may need help from neighboring jurisdictions (mutual aid); and 3) 
catastrophes affecting a significant spatial area that potentially calls for an international 
response (Quarantelli 2000). 
The management of a disaster occurs at the local or regional level by restoring 
infrastructure, incident stabilization, and the return of the community to a pre-event status 
quo. A catastrophe, on the other hand, has a wide spatial impact that affects most of the 
population and infrastructure (Quarantelli 1996; Quarantelli 2000; Perry and Quarantelli 
2005; Quarantelli et al. 2006; Tierney and Oliver Smith 2012; Lindell 2013). Therefore, 
the definition of disaster and catastrophe, as well as the elements comprising both, are 
crucial to understanding the topic of recovery. Simply defined, disaster mitigation occurs 
at the local or regional level, and catastrophe mitigation occurs at the national or 
international levels. 
To obtain the perspective of a particular event, the defining elements of disasters 
and catastrophes require some analysis to foster a better understanding of the differences. 
Regardless of the definition, both disasters and catastrophes require multiple theoretical 
and disciplinary perspectives and cannot be bundled into one single definition (Bates and 
Peacock 1989). In this research, I will focus on the elements of catastrophe, rather than 
the definition, found in the literature on catastrophe. 
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The Different Elements of Catastrophes Verse Disaster 
Quarantelli (1996) differentiates disasters and catastrophes with six primary 
elements. In catastrophes, most if not all of the infrastructure impact occurs over a large 
geographical area (Quarantelli 2000). The infrastructure loss parameters comprise the 
size, or development, of the affected area. Catastrophic impacts prohibit the affected 
population from sheltering with family and friends. This is commonly found in disasters, 
due to massive devastation of the housing sector. The result is masses of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) left with an inability to find shelter. The failure to obtain the 
essential elements required for life distinguishes catastrophes from disasters. These key 
elements include such things as access to medical care (physical and mental), food, water, 
heat, shelter (short and long-term), and security (Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). 
The catastrophe adversely affects national leadership and organized first 
responders (e.g., law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, emergency 
management, military services, health/hospital organizations, and social service/non-
governmental organizations) who during disasters can respond to assist the affected 
population. The effect on the national leadership exacerbates the ability of the affected 
state to lead the response, relief, and recovery efforts. The unavailability of political 
leadership and their coordination, coupled with the loss of first-responders can be 
associated the catastrophe event rather than explicit role abandonment (UN 2005). 
Essentially, first responders (i.e., civilian and professional) who survive the event, 
have no place to coordinate response operations due to the decimation of facilities and 
resources (Quarantelli 1996; Quarantelli et. al 2006). A primary reason for the lack of 
response is due to injury of personnel, deaths, or the inability to establish a single base of 
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operations and communicate critical information on resource needs. A lack of willingness 
to use their skill set to offer assistance is not the prohibiting factor. Tierney and Oliver 
Smith (2012) confirm that high casualty and mortality rates, coupled with social 
separation and dislocation, widespread damage, and less experienced personnel greatly 
impair the overall catastrophic response. 
 The lack of an initial national reaction brings a converging response to the 
catastrophe from the international community. As a part of this response, spontaneous 
volunteers and mounds of donations converge on the catastrophe area. The mass media 
coverage, particularly when there is a massive loss of life, similarly exacerbates the 
challenges that these catastrophe events represent. 
During these developments, interruptions of everyday household routines occur, 
including significant and potentially long-term interruption of critical infrastructure and 
key resources (electricity, potable water, food supply, telephonic infrastructure, sewer, 
and mail service). These interruptions prevent affected victims from having a social time 
routine (i.e., the events and schedule that they are used to maintaining from day to day) 
(Quarantelli 1996; Quarantelli et al. 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2006). 
Why Haiti was a Catastrophe and not a Disaster 
 In assessing if the Haitian earthquake was a disaster or catastrophe, I will revisit 
the elements previously identified by Quarantelli of catastrophe. Hou and Shi (2011) 
references this as the “Catastrophe Model” developed by Quarantelli (Hou and Shi 
2011:29). The six elements of catastrophe described are 1) most of the built environment 
impacted; 2) local first responders are unable to perform their normal roles; 3) assistance 
from neighbors is negligible due to the spatial impact; 4) normal, daily social routines are 
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interrupted; 5) mass media provides 24-hour coverage of the event; and 6) the political 
“arena” is magnified greatly in a catastrophe when compared to a disaster (Quarantelli 
2006:8; Rodriguez et al. 2006). 
 The Haitian government’s initial damage assessment estimated the total damage 
from the earthquake at $7.804 billion (USD). The loss estimates represent $5.722 billion 
(USD) losses, or 70% of the earthquake impact, in the private sector. The public sector 
sustained $2.081 billion, or 30% of the total earthquake impact, representing 120% of 
Haiti’s 2009 Gross National Product (GDP) (Haiti PDNA 2011; Special Envoy to Haiti 
2012). 
 The earthquake damage spanned a broad geographical area of Haiti and affected 
nearly the entire nation. Damage consisted of collapsed structures and 
damaged/destroyed transportation routes that were often blocked with sizeable debris. 
This included significant damage at the primary airports and seaports located in Port au 
Prince. The airport and seaport damage were significant, not only regarding the physical 
damage sustained but from a logistical perspective in receiving aid from the international 
community (Hou and Shi 2011).  
The quake also damaged political institutions and processes such as the 
Presidential Palace, Parliament, Law Courts, and United Nations Stabilization Mission to 
Haiti (MINUSTAH). Most of the Haitian Ministry buildings and other public 
administration buildings were destroyed in the quake (see, Figure 2.1). This left the 
national government unable to respond to the needs of the Haitian people (Haiti PDNA 
2011; Zanotti 2010). First responder coordination/response centers, all modes of 
communication with the outside world, hospitals, health clinics, transportation routes, 
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water supply and distribution systems, and the nation's power grid were disrupted. The 
only direct link of aid assistance for Haiti was from the Dominican Republic, and that 
response was in fact limited (Hou and Shi 2011). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
The earthquake destroyed 105,000 homes and damaged another 208,000 (see, 
Figure 2.2), which eliminated those traditional sheltering options often found in disasters 
(i.e., shelter with family or friends). The education sector had 1,300 schools collapse or 
unusable (Hooper 2015). Similarly, 50 hospitals/medical clinics collapsed or were so 
severely damaged they were not usable (Haiti PDNA 2011). The loss of this critical 
infrastructure created significant disruptions in the daily lives of Haitians for months on 
end (Hou and Shi 2011; Hooper 2015). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE] 
The human death toll for this catastrophic event is estimated at 220,000, with 
another 300,000 injured and 1.5 million internally displaced (IDPs) Haitians. This was on 
top of the aforementioned adverse impact to the critical infrastructure and key resources 
(Hou and Shi 2011; Hooper 2015). Included amongst the deceased were 17% of the 
Haitian government workers. Several of the state’s leading officials thankfully survived – 
UN MINUSTAH Mission Head Hedi Annabi and Deputy Mission Head Luis Carlos da 
Costa and 83 of their staff. An additional 32 members of the UN MINUSTAH staff were 
missing. This level of infrastructure and human toll brought wide media convergence to 
Haiti, compounding relief aid, clogging transportation routes, and delaying much-needed 
aid delivery and recovery (Hou and Shi 2011). 
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The surviving Haitian leadership that attempted to respond to the earthquake 
essentially discarded of the government’s ruling party candidate is making the political 
response to response and recovery untenable. This is not unusual in the history of the 
Haitian government. The eventual election of Michel Martelly as President created a 
political quagmire in the midst of catastrophe. Thus political events left a void of 
governance and leadership for the Haitian people at its time of greatest need (Saye 2010; 
Hou and Shi 2011). In short, resulting context of the earthquake in Haiti clearly meets the 
six elements identified by Quarantelli (Quarantelli 2006; Rodriguez et. al. 2006; Hou and 
Shi 2012). 
Haiti Housing Sector Primary Damage Assessment 
In February 2010, the Government of Haiti provided a post-disaster need 
assessment (PDNA) in support of the country’s recovery and aid appeal to foreign donors 
and investors. The evaluation provided estimates of damages and losses sustained by the 
earthquake and provided an initial overview of the catastrophic impact that Haiti 
suffered. The methodology for the preliminary needs assessment was derived from the 
United Nations Economics Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
(Haiti PDNA 2010). The ECLAC process examines a system of national accounts of the 
country to conduct damage assessments and convert them into estimations of economic 
losses (United Nations 2010). 
 The estimated damage to the housing sector was approximate $2.3 billion (USD), 
making it the most impacted sector. An additional $739 billion (USD) was estimated to 
be needed for emergency and temporary sheltering needs for the 1.5 million IDPs of 
which 302,000 were homeless children. The earthquake destroyed 105,000 homes and 
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damaged another 208,000, with the hardest hit area found in and around Port-au-Prince, 
Jacmel, and Leogane. Of those three critical locations, Leogane was nearly 80% 
destroyed (Haiti PDNA 2010). Haiti has no public housing, so the damage estimate 
covers private housing sector losses (Haiti PDNA 2010). Many of the IDPs (estimates as 
high as 263,000) were migrating to the north and west of Port au Prince in search of food, 
water, and shelter following the earthquake. That migration merely added to the 
complexity of catastrophe aid delivery (IFRC 2010). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE] 
As of December 2015, 59,720 Haitians remain displaced representing approximately 
14,679 households (International Organization for Migration 2015). The remaining 
Haitian IDPs reside in 37 displacement sites consisting of a variety of temporary 
construction, with 51% being makeshift tent shelters, 3% different transitional abodes, 
and the remaining 41% in t-shelters (International Organization for Migration 2015). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE] 
THE DIFFERENT PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Mitigation Phase of Emergency Management 
 Mitigation potentially lessens the impacts to the physical and social environment. 
Regretfully, it is not considered ab initio as one of the top phases of emergency 
management, primarily due to the lack of available funding. Neal (1997) argues 
mitigation should be the first step of emergency management and occur pre-event rather 
than post. Mitigation is performing “efforts that lessen the impacts of disaster” (Phillips, 
Neal, and Webb 2012:327). FEMA defines mitigation as “…the effort to reduce the loss 
of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters (FEMA 2016). For mitigation to 
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be effective, we need to take action now — before the next disaster — to reduce human 
and financial consequences later (analyzing risk, reducing risk, and insuring against risk). 
Mitigation possesses the unique ability to influence who survives the impact of an event. 
It can also lessen the overall cost and time for an impacted area to recover (Emergency 
Management Handbook 2007; Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012). 
 Mitigation is bifurcated into two primary areas: structural and non-structural. 
Structural mitigation affects the physical environment and efforts to strengthen it to 
identified hazards and risks to reduce the effects of event impacts (e.g., safe shelters for 
tornados, hardening of structures to resist tropical storms and seismic activities, as well as 
terrorist incidents). Non-structural mitigation involves the social element – social capital 
– and the human behavioral response to an event (e.g. public education on the hazards 
and risks, warning and notification methods, emergency operation plan development, 
proper land use planning and cataloging, and proper hygiene to reduce the spread of 
disease). The United States learned in the 90’s that the subsidizing of mitigation efforts at 
the state and local level saved federal financial resources during recovery effort after the 
impact of an event on the nation (Coppola 2011; Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012). 
Planning Phase of Emergency Management 
 Planning is the cornerstone of the preparedness process and the anchor for the 
other phases of emergency management (Smith and Birkland 2012). Planning is defined 
as the making of contingencies that describe how personnel, equipment, and other 
resources are used to support incident management response activities. Plans provide the 
mechanisms and systems for setting priorities, integrating multiple entities and functions, 
and ensuring that communications and other systems are available and integrated into a 
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support network for the spectrum of incident management requirements (Blanchard 
2007). 
Hazard and risk analysis occur pre-event and help anchor the other phases of 
catastrophe management (Nigg 1995; Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012). If this type of 
planning does not take place, then the other phases of emergency management are 
substantially less efficient. The planning process is described by the acronym POETE 
(Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercises), which is a non-linear 
process of emergency management planning and part of the FEMA Threat Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) (FEMA 2009; FEMA 2013). This process 
consists of emergency managers, planners, stakeholders (public and private), and subject 
matter experts tasked with developing the most likely hazards to affect the area. This 
encompassing approach establishes the community participation (public and private), 
necessary to develop a suitable emergency operations plan – a general plan of primary 
and secondary responsibilities that will mitigate the impacts of identified hazards and 
risks (FEMA 2009; Smith and Birkland 2012; FEMA 2013). 
An essential criterion of the planning process is that it is guided by the 
contemporary “science of disaster” (Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012:219). Unfortunately, 
planning is often overlooked due to multiple conflicting variables that include a lack of 
financial resources, time, specialized training, and competing priorities. In lesser 
developed nations, a primary focus is on where meals and water are to resourced the next 
day (Tierney, Lindell, and Perry 2001; Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012) thus it is not a 
surprise that such planning is not done. Regardless, planning is required to identify 
deficiencies and development of an improvement plan to close identified gaps. 
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 Planning for disasters and catastrophes occurs at various levels. The most basic 
level is at the individual household level, followed by community, state, national, and 
international levels. The primary focus of the planning efforts consists of life safety, 
incident stabilization, protection of property, and the revitalization of damaged public 
infrastructure, environmental, and cultural elements. Planning is a never ending process 
due to the rotation of officials in planning positions, transient populations, technological 
changes, code enforcement, and land use/planning changes (Phillips, Neal, and Webb 
2012). Planning is paramount to the success of the other, overlapping phases of 
emergency management, and requires a continuous generalized, flexible, and coordinated 
focus (Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012). 
Response Phase of Emergency Management 
The response phase has several definitions within the research literature. The 
National Governor’s Association met in 1979 and defined response as “…the emergency 
assistance for casualties…seek to reduce the probability of secondary damage and to 
speed recovery expectations” (National Governor’s Association 1979:13; Phillips, Neal, 
Webb 2012). Tierney, Lindell, and Perry (2001:81) define response as “actions taken at 
the tome disaster strikes that are intended to reduce threats to life safety, care for the 
victims and to contain secondary hazards and community losses.” FEMA defines 
response as: “Response includes activities to address the immediate and short-term 
actions to preserve life, property, environment, and the social, economic, and political 
structure of the community. Response activities include: 
1. Emergency shelter, housing, food, water and ice; 
2. Search and rescue; 
3. Emergency medical and mortuary services; 
4. Public health and safety; 
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5. Decontamination following a chemical, biological or radiological 
attack; 
6. Removal of threats to the environment; 
7. Emergency restoration of critical services (electric power, water, 
sewer, telephone); 
8. Transportation, logistics, and other emergency services; 
9. Private sector provision of needed goods and services through 
contracts or donations; 
10. Secure crime scene, investigate and collect evidence.”  
(Blanchard 2007:508). 
 
In fulfilling response duties, first responders focus their efforts on emergency 
operation center (EOC) activation for coordination and public warning/notification. From 
the EOC, personnel notify mutual aid partners for resource assistance – staff and 
equipment – and allocate those resources where they are needed, as well as develop an 
incident action plan (IAP) – a guide of objectives to mitigate the incident. The EOC 
provides for smooth interoperable communication, sheltering of IDPs, search and rescue, 
and health/medical care for the sick and injured. The EOC represents a flexible and 
decentralized form of adaptive management; one that provides the best possible 
assistance of the first responders working the event (Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012). The 
initial focus of the EOC is response and mitigation of immediate needs. However, EOC 
planners are working toward the establishment of a transitional recovery plan. Once 
incident stabilization has been achieved, recovery becomes the focus of the affected 
jurisdiction. 
Recovery Phase of Emergency Management 
 Long-term recovery – the focus of this thesis – requires a precise definition that is 
reflective of the whole community. FEMA defines recovery as, “The implementation of 
prioritized actions needed to return an organization’s processes and support functions to 
operational stability following an interruption or disaster” (Blanchard 2007:1025). 
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Unfortunately, most recovery planning efforts occur post-disaster when emotions are 
high, the public is demanding action from the government, and hasty decisions are 
inevitable (Phillips 2016). This frequently leads to poor decision-making outcomes and 
extended periods of recovery. The core elements of recovery will include debris 
management, damage assessments, and use of, or development of, a dedicated recovery 
plan. This is best accomplished with a flexible team and relentless leadership dedication 
(Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012; Phillips 2016). Once the core elements have developed, 
the recovery focus shifts to funding (resources), plan implementation, on-going 
assessments of the recovery progress, and a final assessment of full recovery as defined 
by the whole community (Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012; Phillips 2016). 
 The international perspective shows that the response phase shares basic 
similarities to the United States. The key differences are found in ideas of resilience – the 
ability of a nation to incur the impact of a hazard and recover quickly. Resilience can 
more readily be found in wealthier nations (e.g., Canada, Australia, Japan, or New 
Zealand). Lesser developed countries (LDCs) (e.g., Haiti, Turkey, Indonesia, and India) 
lag in response and as a result incur higher death rates, direct losses to infrastructure, and 
relatively larger economic losses (Phillips, Neal, Webb 2012). The primary obstacles 
LDCs face include poverty, poor infrastructure, vulnerable populations, and lack of 
planning for hazards and risks (e.g., financial constraints, failed states, and increasingly 
technological hazards). 
Recovery occurs in two basic steps, short-term and long-term. Short-term 
recovery is defined as the restoration of “vital life support systems to minimum operating 
standards” (Phillips 2016:7). Examples include, but are not limited to, power restoration, 
33 
basic health services, communications restoration, transportation routes opened, and 
reestablishing the drinking water distribution system. Long-term recovery “may continue 
for some years after a disaster event” (Philips 2016:7). Recovery is the most important 
part of emergency management but entertains less planning and focus than direct 
response obligations. The key to a successful recovery effort is knowledge of hazards and 
risk (specifically from a research-based perspective and its influence during the 
development of the comprehensive and integrated emergency management plan (see, 
Figure 2.5) (Phillips, Neal, and Webb 2012). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.5 ABOUT HERE] 
Phases of Emergency Management Overlap 
While a complete analysis of the overlap of the emergency management phases 
and social processes is beyond the scope of this research, it is a topic that requires brief 
overview to provide an understanding of the recovery process. Recovery is a systematic 
social process, which evolves over time (Phillips 2016). The system (affected area) is 
responding to the event (stressor), and demand will eventually exceed the ability and 
capability of the affected area to respond to the most significant the impact. Demand 
exceeds the capability paradigm. This tipping point segues to Neal’s (1997) argument 
that the phases of disaster are not linear, they overlap, and provide active, and negative 
feedback loops based upon the leadership decision-making processes (e.g., a positive 
feedback process of pro-social behavior may occur following catastrophes by victims and 
IDPs (Rodriguez et al. 2006; Acosta and Chandra 2009)). 
Neal (1997) argues that disaster – emergency management – phases overlap and 
need clarification theoretically and conceptually (Neal 2013). Simply put, phases of 
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disaster (emergency) management are necessary for researchers and practitioners to 
develop research, organize data, and draw conclusions from their analysis. The phases of 
emergency management are nothing more than a heuristic device for professionals and 
researchers (Neal 1997:259; Neal 2013:248).  
Neal elucidates disaster (emergency) management phases may have some benefits 
for the organization of resources and possibly improving practitioner’s capabilities, but 
that phases are irrelevant to those affected by the event. Neal identifies eight specific 
elements supporting his position, 1) all phases of emergency management are mutually 
inclusive, 2) phases of emergency management are multidimensional, 3) phases should 
represent social time verse objective time, 4) multiple perceptions of the event should be 
examined, 5) the culture affected should be reviewed for adjustments to disasters and 
hazards, 6) the phases of emergency management are tied to social change, 7) phases of 
emergency management are linked to determinism and/or 8) the phases are not relevant at 
all (Neal 1997). Neal’s arguments are salient to all phases of emergency management, but 
potentially more useful to the impoverished national context is the topic of event time and 
social time. A conceptual and theoretical quagmire is created for practitioners and 
researchers, leaving the affected people in an emergency management abyss. As event 
and social time exploration continue, the abstract theory, within the research, will begin 
to clarify. 
As examined, a common theme in recovery is the significance of the social 
process of recovery. This social process is not linear since affected individuals process 
recovery over different temporal and spatial periods (Nigg 1995; Tierney and Oliver-
Smith 2012). The social process does not occur during or after the event occurs, but 
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before the event impact on the social element. Nigg (1995) quantifies this by looking at 
how decisions are made pre-event, during the event, and post-event. All communities are 
made up of subsets of social classes who experience a recovery that differ temporally and 
spatially, a theme echoed by Neal (1997) and Neal (2013). The literature here is succinct. 
Reconstruction and development are the dominant modes of recovery in the affected area. 
The sociological aspect of the event has simply been overlooked (Nigg 1995). 
Neal (2013) argues any disruption of the “rhythm of life,” created by social time – 
the perception of events – are disrupted until recovery has completed (Neal 2013:250). 
Specifically, Neal (2013) states people can correlate catastrophic events to calendar and 
clock time or a more social process. The social process of social time – rhythm of life – 
involves the inclusion of the social processes of recovery of IDPs (Phillips 2016). The 
understanding that recovery is not an “outcome of recovery, but a social process” of 
those affected is crucial to understanding the multiple dimensions of recovery, as all 
phases of emergency management link with each other (Nigg 1995:5). 
 
UNDERSTANDING RECOVERY FROM CATASTROPHE 
 I have reviewed the phases of emergency management and specifically how they 
overlap and affect livelihoods and the rhythm of life. I now know that catastrophe 
recovery is more than reconstruction. Among other things, it includes social processes 
that are often overlooked in recovery. In the next subsection, I will look at how the local 
definition of recovery matters and how it shapes the processes of recovery from impact to 
substantive improvement – recovery to a permanent housing solution. In this instance, the 
significant area of focus is the development of a framework that can cover the INGO role 
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in the recovery process (e.g., from reconstruction and the social process to substantive 
improvement and complete recovery). 
The Local Definition of Recovery Matters 
Recovery is often synonymous with other words and scholars differ on a succinct 
definition (Quarantelli 1999; Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). While it allows emergency 
and disaster managers a temporal reference for a particular phase of disaster 
management, confusion tends to arise over how we should determine the definition and 
meaning of recovery (Quarantelli 1999). Absent a pre-defined, narrow definition, 
recovery simply is the return of an affected area to an acceptable level of 
activity/production (Quarantelli 1999; Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). 
Many times recovery for a particular context is defined post-event when a series 
of hastily made decisions tend to take place (Phillips 2016). It is important to define 
recovery pre-event and to gather input from local stakeholders, including vulnerable 
populations such as women, those with functional access needs, the elderly, and the 
impoverished (Smith and Birkland 2012; Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012; Phillips 2016). 
The concept is valid and applicable to emergency and disaster manager practitioners. It is 
also a logical argument and applies to those INGOs delivering aid following catastrophes 
(Smith and Birkland 2012). 
 Quarantelli (1999) addresses a variety of references to recovery and covers the 
need to conceptualize it both operationally and theoretically. Recovery must reference the 
different perspectives of the victims of the catastrophe. Tierney and Oliver-Smith (2012) 
illustrate the lack of data and literature on catastrophic recovery and emphasize the 
creation of suitable Emergency Operations Plans (EOP) that address definitions of 
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recovery. The best recovery definitions tend to occur when citizens and stakeholder reach 
a consensus in the pre-event period. Otherwise, a failure to establish key goals and reach 
them will result. Tierney and Oliver-Smith (2012) offer three examples of recovery 
failure in 2010: 1) the Haiti earthquake; 2) the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and 3) the devastating flooding in Pakistan. 
 Quarantelli (1999) describes the recovery process as reconstruction, rehabilitation, 
restoration, restitution, and finally recovery. In this case, reconstruction is the rebuilding 
of structures destroyed or damaged by an event (Quarantelli 1999; Tierney and Oliver-
Smith 2012). Restoration is the restoring of the affected area to the pre-event condition. 
Rehabilitation takes place when social capital returns to the affected areas. Restoration 
those captures the emotional and psychological recovery of victims following the event 
(Acosta and Chandra 2009; Tierney and Smith 2012). Restitution is the overall return of a 
sense of normalcy and also relates to legal claims that often are associated with crimes or 
acts of terrorism (Tierney and Smith 2012). 
 This research utilizes the systems theory (Mileti 1999) perspective that focuses on 
recovery as the reestablishment of the built environment and the restitution of physical 
and social environments to a pre-event state (i.e., one that possesses resilience and 
sustainability). In other words, reconstruction will have occurred, environmental issues 
have been mitigated, and social capital concerns have been addressed. This can be 
thought of as the overarching system returning to a normal state and awaiting the next 
disruption (Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). 
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Immediate Needs and Short Term Recovery 
Short-term recovery begins in the first few minutes, hours and days that follow a 
disaster or catastrophe event (Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012). According to Lindell 
(2013), the primary goals during the first hours are incident stabilization, restoration 
toward the norm, and restoration of community activities as they were before impact. The 
key elements of short-term recovery include impact area security, sheltering, and 
restoring damaged or destroyed infrastructure (Quarantelli 2000; Tierney and Oliver-
Smith 2012; Lindell 2013). Most citizens rely on the government of the affected state to 
plan and respond in this short term envelope (Coppola 2011). This is critical regarding 
the existing structures on the site and tasks such as demolition, code enforcement, and 
building inspections will take place.  
The government also needs to coordinate spontaneous volunteers, donations 
management, and other incoming disaster aid (Lindell 2013; Phillips 2016). Very few 
residents experience this type of planning in third-world developing countries, and it may 
not be present in more developed economies either. The lack of planning and intervention 
results from a lack of physical, financial, and willingness to prepare and plan for disasters 
and catastrophes. Examples of this lack of preparation can be found in the 2004 Indian 
Ocean earthquake and tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, and the 
Haiti earthquake in 2010 (Coppola 2011). 
 Another critical short-term recovery activity is rapid debris clearance from 
roadways to allow access for first responders. The direct debris is from collapsed 
buildings, flora, fauna, and human remains, but the majority of the wreckage is from the 
built environment (Quarantelli 2000). Rapid clearance is a primary focus may include 
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more than simply pushing debris to the side of a road. The quick removal of debris allows 
access for first responders to search and rescue victims (Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012; 
Phillips 2016). The first response effort, often coordinated and conducted by survivors 
(new groups), typically occurs before the arrival of first responders (Quarantelli 1996; 
Neal 2004; Roriguez et al. 2006). 
The management of these activities is usually assigned to local emergency and 
social services, but a catastrophic event will prohibit such a local response (Quarantelli 
2000; Coppola 2011). Disasters are typically followed by a significant convergence of 
first responders and aid organizations (Phillips 2016). In catastrophes, however, 
convergence is not possible for several days, if at all, and it reveals itself in the form of 
competition for resources in the affected area and inequity in aid relief delivery from the 
international response (Quarantelli 2000). 
Short Term Recovery – Emergency Versus Temporary Sheltering 
 The literature has several definitions of emergency shelter after an event for IDPs. 
The first is the emergency shelter period, which lasts from hours to overnight. Emergency 
sheltering occurs when IDPs seek actual or potential shelter away from their permanent 
domicile (Quarantelli 1982). The International Recovery Platform (IRP) and United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) define emergency shelter as spontaneous 
sheltering. Spontaneous sheltering is the seeking of a haven for those displaced during the 
first 72 hours of an event. Regardless of which definition use, this form of sheltering does 
not undertake feeding or the provision of basic life-sustaining resources (Quarantelli 
1982, UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). 
40 
There is a blurred line between emergency and temporary sheltering, and they can 
easily be confused. In disasters, temporary sheltering usually takes place when IDPs seek 
out the help of nearby family and friends. However, following a catastrophic impact this 
possibility is not an option due to the large geographic area affected. Temporary shelters 
are for those displaced for short or temporary unexpected stays. The UNDP define 
temporary shelter as emergency shelter lasting the first 60 days post event. Both 
definitions cover feeding and providing basic life sustaining resources for those displaced 
(Quarantelli 1982; Quarantelli 1995; UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). 
 In addition to providing shelter and care for IDPs, vulnerable populations, pets, 
and IDPs with special medical and health needs require assistance. General sheltering 
sites are not necessarily equipped to handle the functional access and needs of IDPs. 
Therefore, consideration of these requirements is necessary for the planning phase to 
have resources dedicated to the problem. INGOs, NGOS, and Faith Based Organizations 
(FBO) are first organizations that can and do provide those resources and should be 
included in the planning and response phases of emergency management (United Nations 
2008; UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). 
 
SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENT – LONG TERM RECOVERY 
 As recovery transitions from emergency and temporary sheltering, five primary 
objectives or goals become the focus of longer term recovery. The ultimate aim at this 
stage is the reestablishment of permanent housing for those displaced by the catastrophic 
event. The permanent housing solution has to be sustainable by the occupants. It also has 
to be hazard resilient, meaning that it anticipates or mitigates future disaster risks. The 
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final two goals are dependent on the social norms of the area affected. The permanent 
housing solution must be culturally acceptable, not to the developer or donor, but to the 
stakeholders affected by the event. Moreover, it should do no harm to the environment 
(environment-friendly construction) (UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). 
 Lindell (2013) indicates the long-term recovery is lengthy and includes a multi-
discipline and multi-dimensional response from organizations. The interested 
organizations consider mitigation strategies – hazard source and land use planning – and 
select building construction practices that result in a hazard resilient recovery. 
Long term recovery is only possible with economic development and funding streams – 
public and private – with historical and cultural preservation for relevant areas. Once the 
funding streams begin to flow, the mobilization of resources, such as personnel and 
equipment, begins and the process of recovery begins. As it continues, internal and 
external direction, control, and coordination should occur among the recovery 
organizations to ensure programs are succeeding and are cost effective. However, many 
times this does not occur and accountability and transparency become an afterthought 
within the recovery process. To prevent this lack of responsibility and oversight, Lindell 
(2013) suggests that legal counsel, independent auditors, and administrative should help 
support and document the progress of recovery at different temporal periods (Lindell 
2013). 
Long-Term Recovery – Temporary/Transitional Housing 
 Temporary or transitional, housing is the transition between emergency/temporary 
shelter to the development of housing arrangements for IDPs. The UNDP Shelter 
Guidance Document (2010) defines transitional sheltering (housing) as a “habitable 
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covered living space and secure, healthy living environment with the privacy and dignity 
to those within it during the period between a conflict or natural disaster and the 
achievement of a durable shelter solution” (UNDP 2010:14). The focus in this process of 
recovery is on returning IDP livelihoods to a sense of normalcy or routine. In temporary 
housing, IDPs may reside in mobile homes, leased apartments or safe/secure homes, or 
tent camps (e.g. Port au Prince, Haiti). The UNDP (2010), identify this as interim housing 
and it lasts from one-year post event to complete recovery to permanent housing 
(Quarantelli 1982; UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). Many IDPs in Port au Prince continue to 
remain in the tempory housing (i.e., tent camps) over five years after the earthquake 
(International Organization for Migration 2015). 
 The UNDP offers four options for transitional sheltering (housing) with each 
having positive and negatives. The first is known as an “In-Situ” strategy for 
temporary/transitional shelters (UNDP:19). This sheltering type allows the IDPs to reside 
on or near their property during recovery. This provides less disruption to routine, allows 
for IDP participation in the recovery effort and permanent structure design, as well as 
maintaining the livelihood of the IDPs. During repair or reconstruction, the IDPs can also 
acquire additional land, if needed, for construction. “In Situ” sheltering is often seen as 
the sensible solution to longer term recovery, but it provides fewer creature comforts for 
the IDPs (UNDP 2010:19). The second alternative involves the conversion an existing 
public facility to residential use. The specifications can be planned, and the facility 
converted to provide for a routine atmosphere. Costs for this housing alternative can be 
prohibitive (UNDP 2010). 
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The remaining methods of recovery are passive and boil down to not providing 
temporary structure and allowing IDPs to locate their shelter. These shelter locations 
often are found with family or friends, long term rentals, long term motel/hotel stays, or 
long-term emergency shelter stays. This may be effective for extremely short-term 
sheltering, but will not suffice in a catastrophic event environment. 
A less efficient but frequently used strategy is to create “congregate” 
encampments (UNDP 2010:27). This option is often used in less developed nations, and 
these encampments may bring more negative implications to the IDPs than positive 
results (see, Figure 2.6) A primary issue with these tent cities is the psychological stigma 
of being associated with the camps. It is also is exceedingly difficult for the host 
organization to provide all of the essential needs of the IDPs staying in the shelter for any 
length of time. This means that the camps begin ok but devolve over time. The strategy 
also has substantive problems on critical aspects of long-term recovery. Encampments 
typically prohibit the participation of the IDP community in recovery design and 
reconstruction process (e.g., their involvement will be based on location and access to the 
damaged or destroyed homes). Although encampments have some adverse effects, it 
clearly is the most cost efficient path for responding governments and INGOs. Thus, it is 
frequently used during recovery operations (UNDP 2010). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2.6 ABOUT HERE] 
Long-Term Recovery – Permanent Housing 
 Permanent housing ultimately is the accomplishment that marks recovery. 
Permanent housing allows IDPs to return to their repaired/reconstructed home in the 
same neighborhood, albeit one that hopefully is more resilient to anticipated hazards. 
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Alternatively, IDPs may be relocated to a home as part of an appropriate mitigation plan 
to lessen the impact of future disasters. Quarantelli and the UNDP do not make a clear 
distinction between the definition of the final step in the housing recovery. Unlike 
sheltering, a sharp demarcation line between temporary and permanent housing does not 
exist. During this period, IDPs are returning to their homes or new homes depending 
upon the mitigation program. They also are returning to their livelihoods and establishing 
social ties. A routine of normalcy is reestablished, and the rhythm of life resumes 
(Quarantelli 1982; Oliver-Smith 1990; Burke and Afnan 2005; United Nations 2008; 
UNDP 2010; Zanotti 2010; Tierney and Oliver-Smith 2012; Neal 2013; International 
Organization for Migration 2015; Phillips 2016). 
 
HOUSING RECOVERY FOLLOWING CATASTROPHE EVENTS 
 Recovery following a catastrophic event occurs in multiple stages and along 
different theoretical dimensions. The need for a local definition and its importance in the 
affected community’s definition of what recovery looks like makes it a very complex 
phenomenon. The process has some inherent conflicts, such as those that exist between 
donor/INGO visions and the stakeholders (i.e., differences on what recovery should look 
like post event). Assessment and identification of immediate needs must occur, with an 
emphasis on vulnerable populations, women, children, and the impoverished (Tierney 
and Oliver-Smith 2012). The recovery process is further complicated by the differences 
found between event time and social time and the overlapping phases of emergency 
management that eventually result in IDPs returning to permanent homes. 
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Shelter to Permanent Housing Transition Process 
 The transition process from sheltering to permanent housing is a delicate and 
emotional, social process of recovery. The focus should always remain on the personal 
safety of those involved in recovery efforts and IDPs. This can be achieved by defining 
targeted outcomes within the recovery plan that should be developed pre-disaster and 
modified post-disaster. If targeted outcomes have not been defined to match the 
definition of recovery, then issues may arise. 
 The critical first step of the housing recovery is to identify the leader (leadership 
team) that is going to implement the recovery plan. This person (team) will have to 
determine the partners and donors necessary to provide the funding mechanism for 
substantive recovery (Special Envoy to Haiti 2012). The core element of leadership that 
appears in the literature on recovery is the selection of a dedicated and relentless 
individual who can adapt and overcome the obstacles that will be encountered during the 
recovery effort (UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016).  
The United Nations has developed a toolkit to assist INGOs and other 
organizations in their recovery efforts. This document is the LENNS toolkit and provides 
a flowchart and checklist guide for recovery efforts (United Nations 2009). A similar 
document, the IFRC shelter kit, is available from the International Federation of the Red 
Cross (IFRC 2009). These documents serve as reference guides for the recovery team 
from the sheltering to permanent housing. A solid process flow chart (see, Figure 2.7) is 
provided by Jha et al. (2010). 




Debris management is an early part of the recovery process and requires pre-
disaster planning (Quarantelli 1999). Most communities spend time, energy, and funding 
on emergency response and limited efforts are put toward debris management pre-
planning, which ends up being critical (Brown 2011; Phillips 2016). Debris management 
is “…the clearing and disposal of waste generated by disasters” (McEntire 2006:23). 
Debris consists of aggregates, vegetation, construction and demolition materials, and 
white goods (refrigerators, washers and dryers, and freezers) (Phillips 2016). 
Debris management is bifurcated into two phases. Phase I is emergency clearance 
allowing access to the area for first responders. Phase I debris management allows for life 
safety response by emergency services and occurs during the response phase of 
emergency management (Phillips 2016). Typically, Phase I takes place during the day 
one to day three post-event impact (Fetter and Rakes 2012; Phillips 2016). 
Phase II is the sorting of debris for proper disposal. Phase II is long-term debris 
management and involves the separation of rubble according to the community’s pre- or 
post-debris master plan (Ekici et al. 2009; Fetter and Rakes 2012). This phase can last 
months to years depending on the complexity of the event (Fetter and Rakes 2012; 
Phillips 2016). Another significant consideration to be made for recovery planning and 
organizations is the subsequent use of debris as raw materials for the repair and 
reconstruction process. This has been a successful strategy for resource procurement in 
catastrophe settings (UNDP 2010). The final process is the removal of debris that is 
hazardous or of no use to the recovery process. Specially designed disposal methods are 
required to protect the environment from this form of debris, and it should be addressed 
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pre- or post-event (UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). 
Home Repair/Reconstruction and Construction Site Selection 
 The recovery organizations first decision often revolves around site selection and 
the future hazards that may be present within the surrounding area (IFRC 2009). The 
primary goal is to determine if IDPs can build back safely in the same area, or if that is 
not an option, an alternative site location must be explored. This decision is hazard/risk 
dependent, and the final location is crucial regarding mitigation. Obviously, if there have 
been repeated losses at the same place, relocating the affected area is the only option 
(UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). 
If the choice is to build back, on-site, then some positive synergies exist. A 
critical element is the maintenance of the social group cohort. Building back on site 
allows IDPs to shelter on-site, or nearby, and participate in the reconstruction and overall 
design process. This alternative also provides easy access to existing infrastructure and 
alleviates the costs of building infrastructure to meet the needs of IDPs (e.g. water 
distribution systems, sanitary systems, and access to the electrical grid) (UNDP 2010). 
If relocation is the only option, numerous factors have to be considered (Dikmen 
2006; UNDP 2010; Hooper 2015). The initial determination is whether relocation is a 
viable option for the area (Dikmen 2006; UNDP 2010; Hooper 2015). The second most 
critical decision involved land acquisition and the ability to determine land ownership 
rights. In third world developing countries, land tenure records are often not available and 
when so can be inaccurate (UNDP 2010).  
These complex decisions are best made pre-event, but most jurisdictions do not 
provide planning on land tenure, land use, or relocation in the emergency operation plans. 
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If no pre-plan exists, a site assessment and relocation plan is required to relocate the 
affected area. This increases cost and slows the recovery efforts, thus increasing public 
pressure on government leadership and organizations to do something (even if it is 
wrong). Subject matter experts (SMEs) and personnel involved in technical assistance 
sub-specialties can assist in all facets of site location to relocation. 
Regardless, a regional and whole community approach should involve all 
stakeholders in the relocation planning if it is pre- or post-event. The best institution to 
guide this process is the government, but as we have seen in Haiti, corruption and a failed 
state environments provide a weak foundation for recovery that often stalls. The delay 
and collapse of the recovery process are not necessarily due to a single variable but can 
be tied back to multiple variables associated with the failed state. 
Reconstruction Program Implementation 
 Recovery is a social process that requires an orderly structure to be successful. 
Program implementation is a crucial element as well as the ability to show substantive 
and visible efforts of the recovery process through proper management practices. The 
method includes structure design, resourcing laborers and materials, site selection, and 
subject matter experts (SME’s) as well as Technical Assistance (TA), and the 
involvement of local stakeholders (e.g., 95% of the reconstruction projects worldwide are 
constructed with owner input (LENNS 2009; UNPD 2010:54; Phillips 2016)). 
There are two conceptual methods of program implementation in use around the 
world government execution and original implementation. These approaches are broken 
down into four particular areas, and the implementation elements include: 1) owner and 
community drove reconstruction; 2) government/donor/INGO oriented reconstruction, 
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3)contractor drove reconstruction; and 4) a hybrid method that consists of the first three 
methods. Each of the methods has positive and negative attributes of the recovery 
process. The determinants of method selection typically will include variables such as the 
area affected, availability of materials and resources, institutional stability, government 
stability, the skillset of the labor pool, and the involvement of the IDPs within their 
recovery effort (UNDP 2010). Regardless of approach, stakeholders must be involved in 
the effort of reconstruction and those organizations involved must establish a balance of 
coordination and collaboration for reconstruction success (UNDP 2010). 
When owners, or the community, drive implementation it can create an 
environment of robust, relentless, and decisive local leadership to drive the reconstruction 
process. In this situation, the owner or community are provided a funding stream and 
must manage the whole rebuilding process. They hire contractors, SMEs, and additional 
TA may be procured at the owner's request. This often is an efficient method as it 
provides stakeholders the ability to implement, manage, and be involved in the 
reconstruction and recovery of an impact area (UNDP 2010). 
Several factors affect the owner/community-driven implementation methods. 
Keys to the success of this approach include the available labor pool, the simplicity of 
construction design, limited completion of recovery pressure, and elements of self-
initiative and reliance. Other factors to be considered are items like the ability of the 
owner/community to match the overall recovery needs of the impacted area, future 
concerns over resilience and hazard reduction, and the idiosyncratic use of SMEs and TA 
personnel (UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016). The potential for low overhead costs and 
stakeholder involvement act to improve stakeholder satisfaction with recovery efforts. 
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This, in turn, results in a shorter period of displacement and return to permanent housing 
as well as greater IDP occupancy rates. All of these characteristics add pride to the 
recovery process, which positively affects psychological and sociological recovery 
(UNDP 2010). 
When successful, the owner/community method is valuable as it allows for 
sustainable housing and the preservation of local culture. Unfortunately, this 
implementation method will not succeed in some areas of the world, especially those 
found in lesser developed nations. Issues of extreme poverty, high population density, 
and an inadequate labor pool (i.e., one that does not possess the numbers and knowledge 
necessary to construct housing) adversely affect the recovery outcome. Other recovery 
priorities also present limitations such as the inability to build back with resilience and 
not reducing the future risk to the area (UNDP 2010). 
Government driven programs are the fastest and easiest, as long as it is competent 
and possesses the knowledge base to initiate and complete complex construction efforts. 
The government can approach this by taking full control of the reconstruction or provide 
the authority for an organization to manage the program implementation (e.g. INGOs, 
NGOs, FBOS, and private organizations). In Haiti’s case, the failed state and corruption 
prevented the international community from supporting this effort and existing 
organizations in Haiti did not possess the knowledge base to leave the program 
implementation (UNDP 2010; Ramachandran and Walz 2012). In most cases, when the 
government manages program implementation there is little input from stakeholders 
(IDPs affected) leading to limited satisfaction with the reconstruction effort. 
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The arguments against governmental implementation come from different 
corners. In some circumstances, affected IDPs will refuse to cooperate with the 
government, especially if it is an authoritarian context that engenders trust problems. 
Other concerns involve the ability to affect the physical environment. Governments may 
be unable to secure the available labor pool or knowledge base necessary for a successful 
recovery effort (e.g., failed states/economies).  
In governmental implementation efforts, it is critical for the socio-political and 
economic climate to be in the balance so that coordination and collaboration (meshing) 
integration occur seamlessly. If this can happen, then it creates a “complete and aligned” 
mechanism of program implementation, thus providing the best scenario for 
reconstruction success (UNDP 2010:53). 
The third method of program implementation involves hired contractors with 
funding provided by specific donors and INGOs. This strategy eliminates the need for a 
construction knowledge base. However, it loses the valuable synergy of training the local 
labor pool and improving the future knowledge base that is critical for risk reduction. 
Outside contractors, especially those who are experienced in catastrophe recovery, bring 
communication and coordination experience that may help stakeholders avoid confusion 
in the process. This is especially true when it comes to the value of hazard and risk 
reduction construction (Chandra and Acosta 2009; UNDP 2010). 
Contractor driven implementation is dependent on donor and INGO funding 
streams. Thus budget changes can occur that delay the program and keep IDPs in shelters 
for longer periods. However, experienced contractors produce faster construction times, 
less fatigue on the local labor pool, and they have the ability to overcome problems 
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associated with the lack of construction knowledge within the local labor pool. It can also 
prohibit stakeholder involvement under the right circumstances. The “one size fits all” 
construction pitfall often leaves unmet IDP needs, and does not give adequate 
consideration to issues of diversity (UNDP 2010:54). The use of multiple contractors 
may offer some improvements in this regard. 
Contracting, however, has some serious pitfalls. Hired contractors are often blind 
to issues of local culture and heritage, and that can result in construction that is not 
compatible with the affected area – materials that are not right for the climate or that are 
not sustainable by the homeowner/occupant (UNDP 2010:54). Another issue is the profit 
motives of hired contractors within a disaster/catastrophe setting. Contractors can and do 
cut corners during construction to fatten their margins, and those cutbacks affect 
sustainability and resiliency. Thus contracting approaches bring the need for independent 
oversight, INGO accountability, and transparency, as well as a lack of local knowledge 
on construction material selection. 
The final method is a hybrid method of program implementation. This method 
applies a portion each of the above implementation methods. The key elements of this 
approach focus on the inherent strength of the community, government, and contractor 
driven implementation. The hybrid method involves the stakeholders (affected IDPs) in 
the reconstruction process, but intentionally avoids problems associated with missing 
labor skill sets. In these instances, the hybrid method relies on reconstruction SMEs and 
TAs to provide the needed skill set to achieve recovery with construction standards and 
appropriate site selection. 
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A hybrid method is a collaborative approach that allows training programs of the 
local labor pool to build upon their individual skillsets for future sustainability (UNDP 
2010; Smith and Birkland 2012). Overall this increases the efficacy of reconstruction and 
improves IDP satisfaction regarding the recovery effort. Specifically, it helps target 
knowledgeable, skilled labor toward the affected area and uses the appropriate resources 
and materials for the region of the world (climate and culture). This makes available 
domestic resources that aid in resilience and hazard reduction.  
Most importantly, the community approach to recovery involves the stakeholders. 
It provides a one-stop shop for resources with collaboration, and a cultivates the rapport 
and trust of the people located in the affected area. The final, and crucial element, is the 
formation of a stakeholder committee to provide input and oversight and to interface with 
governmental actors. The implementation, oversight, and involvement of local 
stakeholders is paramount to a fruitful and substantive recovery from a catastrophic 
impact (UNDP 2010). 
Culturally Acceptable Housing Design and Construction 
 The building design is a critical element for reconstruction. Reconstructed houses 
must remain similar to pre-event conditions, account for expanding families, provide 
some variety, and be hazard resistance (Phillips 2016). Housing design must serve two 
roles – short term viability (sheltering) and long-term housing. The primary elements of 
appropriate building design include external appearance, basic layout, functionality, 
resilience to future hazards, climate adaptability, and sustainability based on risk 
(geography, geology, hydrology) (UNDP 2010). 
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 The design of the reconstructed homes requires adaptation to the imminent 
hazards and risks of the impacted area (Phillips 2016). This also takes into account the 
need for more stringent building codes and the build-back-better philosophy (UNDP 
2010). One recommended practice for the impacted area is to create a compliance code 
document and a catalog of construction design. These documents allow two-way 
communication and understanding between the IDP stakeholders and the organization 
chosen for implementation (UNDP 2010). Each of these documents should be publicly 
available, and their location made known through resource centers and public education. 
 As discussed earlier, local stakeholder involvement (especially vulnerable 
populations) is key to a successful recovery (Phillips 2016). A local stakeholder 
committee can streamline decision-making and provide local cultural guidance. That 
accomplishes multiple goals, including the preservation of local culture, history, heritage, 
and the maintenance of vernacular construction (e.g., the use of construction material 
locally available). This leads to the two options of how to build the structures back, 
engineered or non-engineered. 
 Engineered structures use SMEs and TA to construct homes that can withstand 
future impacts from the hazards and risks faced within the area. This method also takes 
into account current codes or more stringent codes that are often implemented following 
event impact. This approach is achieved by trained contractors or contractors who 
provide assistance to the owner/community, government, or through a hybrid method of 
implementation. If properly done, engineered structures can also maintain the natural 
appeal of the local culture and maintain resiliency to external forces (UNDP 2010). 
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 Non-engineered structures, like those found in Haiti following the earthquake, are 
constructed by local labor who do not necessarily possess the ability to ensure hazard and 
risk resilience. Marshall et al. (2011) found non-engineered, vernacular structures in Port 
au Prince and Leogane, collapsed due to poor vernacular materials and craftsmanship. 
The inherited knowledge of the laborers constructing the homes may provide some 
measure of natural resistance to hazards and risks, but that may or may not be enough for 
future threats. Typically, the application of contemporary construction methods and 
building materials must be applied for true resilience to be accomplished. 
 The primary issues with hazard-resistant structures are costs and the altered 
appearance of the housing landscape. Structures built to withstand external forces and 
risks simply cost more. Construction materials are more expensive and may not be locally 
available or culturally suitable to the area. Also, SMEs and TA assistance are required if 
the local labor pool does not possess the skill set necessary for construction. After 
construction is completed, the future cost of maintenance is also needed, and occupants 
should not be pushed beyond their financial means to keep up the structure (UNDP 
2010). 
 Architectural design should look at the history of disaster in the affected area and 
apply lessons learned during the recovery process. This applies to temporary sheltering 
and the ultimate permanent housing solution. Some attention is necessary for the socio-
cultural aspects of the area, and those are best learned from local stakeholders. Seemingly 
little things, like doors and windows, can drive the difference between stakeholder 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction. If recovery is made correctly, it is only done once. It is 
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accepted by the local culture and resembles what the area looked like pre-impact, but 
resilient and sustainable. 
Housing Reconstruction Materials and Resources 
 The selection of proper reconstruction materials affects eventual recovery 
outcomes and the local economy of the affected area. Seven considerations can be found 
in this selection of materials: 1) quality; 2) cost; 3) culturally appropriateness’ 4) local 
knowledge on resources; 5) local availability; 6) economic externalities; and 7) 
environmental impact (UNDP 2010). 
 Quality and cost of reconstruction material are directly related. Poor quality 
materials will not withstand time or the external forces of future events. The quality of 
construction materials is often the result of poor craftsmanship during manufacture or the 
cost cutting off suppliers to increase profit margins, both of which are likely during the 
high demand caused by disaster events. Therefore, an analysis of the costs and benefit 
must occur before the decision is made to use of locally available construction materials. 
This analysis should look at the overall cost of program implementation to determine if it 
is sustainable and can be funded by one of the previously mentioned methods of 
implementation. If the costs do outweigh the local benefit, then the implementing 
organization must look beyond the domestic market to procure appropriate reconstruction 
materials (UNDP 2010). 
 Building materials must be suitable for the affected area. Climate degradation of 
the material is the primary concern for material, especially in tropical climates where 
high heat, humidity, and salinity content leads to rapid deterioration. Insects and other 
vermin must be included in determinations made by program implementation 
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organizations. The final aspect of material is the cultural acceptance of the material by 
the IDPs and occupants of the reconstructed home. Local awareness of the reconstruction 
material is invaluable, especially for organizations not familiar with traditional 
construction methodologies and material use in the affected area (UNDP 2010). 
 A significant concern, following catastrophes, is the availability of the 
reconstruction material and existing competition for the material from other 
organizations. The supply and the demand for construction materials are exceeded 
following catastrophes, which requires materials to be imported/transported to the 
affected area. This affects not only the cost, but local acceptability, and the resilience of 
the material to local environmental effects. This tends to create a future dependence on 
foreign materials for future maintenance. The best method, if possible and available, is 
the use of high-quality construction material from the affected. This can be potentially 
achieved with SMEs and TA from contemporary construction personnel (UDNP 2010; 
Marshall et al. 2011). 
 If a local material is available and can be of use, it does provide a positive impact 
on the local economy by providing a cash infusion that can generate jobs for victims of 
the event. The reverse is also true. If the material is not available or of poor quality, 
Marshall et al. (2011) suggest that it has the potential to destroy local building material 
businesses and reduce available jobs. In some instances, foreign construction material has 
forced the closure of local firms. This causes a further drag on the economy and 
adversely affects the livelihoods of those affected by a catastrophic event.  
Disaster settings also bring out the potential for insect infested construction 
material and the importation of insects and vermin not indigenous to the affected area. 
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The program implementing organization must be familiar with these issues and gain local 
knowledge from stakeholders to get a biological/environmental understanding of material 
sourcing. A proper debris management program can aid this process by reusing debris 
and recycling clean, woody debris and aggregate for the reconstruction process (Phillips 
2016). 
Use of Local Labor in Repair/Reconstruction 
 A delicate economic balance must be maintained when identifying the local labor 
pool following a catastrophe. All persons can provide positive input to the recovery 
process. This includes skilled construction workers, volunteers, skilled labor in 
demolishing damage structures, recycling professionals, and SMEs. Regardless of skilled 
or unskilled labor, a huge demand exists following catastrophe recovery (UNDP 2010; 
Phillips 2016). 
 The short and long-term impact on existing businesses and the labor pool requires 
thoughtful analysis. First, evaluations of the number of people capable of providing labor 
for the reconstruction program must be conducted. Second, the implementing 
organziations must establish a competitive wage – one high enough to gather sufficient 
workers, but not high enough to bring in foreign laborers. Reconstruction jobs can help 
establish a damaged financial market and help bolster business profits among those 
affected. However, if the wage is too high it will tend to draw in international workers, 
who have special skills, and they will take the jobs from the local labor pool. This will 
apply further pressure on an already fragile economy. 
 Three techniques are used for labor sourcing following a catastrophe. The first is 
food for work. A reconstruction implementation organization will hire a local labor pool 
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and in return for labor will provide food for their family. This accomplishes two things, it 
provides local skilled workers with a job and self-worth, as well as providing some of the 
basic essential elements of survival for those affected. The community, as a whole, also 
benefits as they begin to see the visible signs of recovery associated with the efforts of 
their family, friends, and neighbors. This is a part of the social and psychological healing 
of the affected area. It will not be possible for all to participate, however, and vulnerable 
populations must be covered by food aid programs (UNDP 2010). 
 The second strategy is cash for work. This program provides a base salary for the 
work the laborer provides. It infuses cash directly into the local economy for the laborer 
to support themselves and their family. Again, this brings a sense of self-worth, positively 
impacts the IDPs livelihoods and affects the social and psychological healing (UNDP 
2010; Special Envoy to Haiti 2012). This method is consonant as it tends to replace 
laborers’ jobs that were lost in the disaster event. 
 Owner labor is the final method. The owners of homes for reconstruction are 
provided construction materials and the technical assistance necessary to begin rebuilding 
their homes. This reduces overall recovery costs while accomplishing the same things as 
the previous two concepts. The drawback is the lack of stimulus in the form of cash and 
liquidity. Cash flow is a serious problem in these settings, and monetary support is 
necessary for the basic elements of survival for laborers and their families (food, water, 
shelter, heat, and security) (UNDP 2010). 




ROLES OF INGOs IN RECOVERY FROM CATASTROPHE 
 To this point in the research, catastrophe recovery discussions revolved around 
specific processes for those organizations tasked with implementing response and 
recovery activities (i.e., from emergency sheltering to permanent housing to create 
substantial recovery). Now I am going to segue to the organizational level discuss the 
role of INGOs following global catastrophes. In this section, I will examine the INGO 
role in catastrophe response, aid relief, and the recovery process. 
International Non-Governmental Organizations Defined 
Tornquist-Chesnier (2004:253) describe INGOs as “…private, non-profit 
associations that cannot exercise public prerogative.” An additional definition describes 
INGOs as “…an organization independent of the government whose primary mission is 
not commercial but focuses on social, cultural, educational, and other types of issues” 
(Coppola 2011:). Regardless of definition, INGOs play critical roles in food delivery, 
temporary sheltering, and transitional housing, sewer and sanitation, and primary or 
secondary medical care (Natsios 1995). INGOs also are important in reestablishing the 
social, economic, and development sectors following disaster events (Chandra and 
Acosta 2009). 
INGOs have existed since the early nineteenth century (Yves-Saunier 2009; 
Hannigan 2012). The first legal non-governmental (NGO) recognition was formed in 
Belgium in 1919. However, since the 1970’s, NGO have become major players in 
development (reconstruction), human rights, environment (recovery), and humanitarian 
relief efforts (Yves-Saunier 2009; Hannigan 2012). 
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INGO Structure and Framework in the Global Landscape 
 The distinction between NGOs and INGOs occurred in Strasbourg, France on 
April 24, 1996, and is associated with an international legal statute for NGOs operating 
internationally. The European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of 
International INGOs provides the framework for this distinction. INGOs, operating 
internationally, do so under the international law. The law sets rules developed by 
member states of the United Nations to regulate relationships and interactions of INGOs 
in sovereign nations following catastrophes. The public law also applies to governmental 
actors and non-state actors. The influence of non-state actors on negotiations and 
monitoring is increasing with the rapid growth of INGOs over past several decades 
(Tornquist-Chesnier 2004). International law provides the legal framework that INGOs 
operate (Coppola 2011; Natsios 1995). Specifically, Article 71 of the UN charter allows 
the: 
 “… [Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations, which are concerned 
with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations 
concerned.]” (United Nations n.d.). 
 
 Four primary units of the United Nations govern INGOs and their aid relief 
efforts abroad. These first units are the World Food Program, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), with the latter being 
lackluster in performance and quality (Natsios 1995). The United Nations created the 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), in 1991, to oversee worldwide humanitarian 
responses to manage the international relief aid more efficiently (Natsios 1995). 
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 Modern day INGOs, developed after 1945, operate under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN) (Hannigan 2012). The crucial element of the INGO response is the 
direct request from the sovereign nation for assistance from the international community, 
including INGOs. The request typically originates from the United Nations with an 
appeal for aid and assistance to the affected nation (Cliffe and Luckham 1999). The 
management of INGO services is via a board of directors, with term limits to create 
diversity, guided by the mandates and vision of the individual mission and vision of the 
organization. These boards, often historically based, provide an essential guide for 
fundraising and obtaining donations to meet organizational goals and objectives (Natsios 
1995). Foreign INGOs works under the same premise as the United States-based NGOs 
but differ slightly in scope and practice. 
The rapid growth of INGOs in the international community creates several issues 
and concerns. The most significant problem resides in the failure of international law to 
accommodate the rapid INGO expansion, allowing INGOs to provide direct influence in 
drafting and monitoring organizational norms and assessments (Tornquist-Chesnier 
2004). The continued lack of accountability and transparency to the public are relatively 
consistent issues withing these groups. Donors frequently are unable to determine how 
the INGO applies their donations, especially if the donor does not tie specific criteria for 
application of their funding (Tornquist-Chesnier 2004). 
INGO Funding Mechanisms and Methods 
 The act of donation to INGOs who participate in disaster and catastrophe response 
is an altruistic behavior for many people. Phillips (2016) separates the motives for 
individuals contributions into three primary categories: individual altruism, collective 
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altruism, and situational altruism (Phillips 2016:379-380). Individual altruism occurs 
when donors target cases they determine to be worthy (e.g., feeding hungry children 
worldwide). Collective altruism is a social arrangement where a jurisdiction or social 
element of society decides to take care of each other independent of external funding 
(e.g., a particular need in a community such as a family experiencing extraordinary 
medical expenses from an illness or injury). The final altruistic focus is situational and 
focuses specifically on the impact of disasters and catastrophes worldwide (e.g., the SMS 
text message drive by the ARC following the 2010 Haiti earthquake). 
INGOs are funded through a multitude of methods and mechanisms. The most 
prominent methods include donations, fundraisers/drives, government grants, bilateral 
agreements, multilateral agreements, governmental pledges, and other philanthropic and 
organizational foundations. Larger INGOs, such as the America Red Cross, Catholic 
Charities, Oxfam International, Doctors Without Borders, have continuous fundraising 
methods throughout the year. Smaller INGOs are disaster and catastrophe centric in their 
fundraising efforts. 
 Donations and fundraisers/drives are reasonably straight forward and are 
sponsored by the INGO. They focus on a specific time of year – peak disaster and 
catastrophe seasons worldwide – to ensure they have adequate resources to respond to 
future recovery efforts. Large scale donors may have specific programs they ask the 
INGO to focus on and thus tie specific criteria to the contribution. Otherwise, donations 
may target general aspects of response and recovery including humanitarian relief, 
hazard, and risk reduction, reconstruction and development, medical and health needs, 
and vector-borne illness reduction.  
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INGOs are successful at raising millions of dollars each year for these types of 
missions (Coppola 2011; Hannigan 2012; Ramachandran and Walz, 2012; Phillips 2016). 
A clear example can be found with the Haiti earthquake catastrophe when the American 
Red Cross (ARC) raised approximately $32 million dollars with $10 donations to their 
organization via short message service (SMS) texting via mobile devices (Ramachandran 
and Walz 2012). 
 INGOs also apply for and receive grants and contracts through governmental 
agencies. Subsidies and contracts are tied to a specific area of response and recovery. 
However, grants and contracts have many bureaucratic elements within their underlying 
agreements. INGOs must fulfill these different criteria and maintain the proper reporting 
and compliance with agreements to maintain funding streams. An example of a grant or 
contract is the application and receipt of a grant from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (ARC 2010; ARC 2011). ARC received funds from 
USAID for programs and projects in Hait to rebuild housing, infrastructure, 
hospitals/health clinics, and other destroyed critical infrastructure and key resources 
(CI/KR) (ARC 2010; ARC 2011; IFRC 2010; Special Envoy to Haiti 2012). 
Governments can also pledge funds, as well as technical assistance, directly to affected 
countries government (bilateral donations) as long as governmental institutions are 
legitimate and stable (Coppola 2011). The events following the Haiti earthquake 
prohibited the Haitian government from receiving significant funding. In that instance, 
only 3% of the pledges were routed to the government, and the remainder essentially 
funneled through a network of INGOs (ARC 2010; ARC 2011; Ramachandran and Walz 
2012; Phillips 2016). Unfortunately, the by-passing of governmental institutions is not a 
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limited phenomenon, and it occurs worldwide due to the prevalence of failed states and 
intrastate conflict (Maren 1997; Cliffe and Luckham 1999; Polman 2010; Special Envoy 
to Haiti 2012). 
 Multilateral donations represent a joint effort between a coalition of nations 
international governance organizations, such as the United Nations OECD, and World 
Development Banks, such as the World Bank and the Inter-Asia Development Bank 
(IADB). These complex cooperative agreements will include critical resources such as 
financial contributions, technical assistance, and the subject matter experts necessary to 
improve coordination and development of response and recovery strategies. These efforts 
often have a prospective development structure and expand outside of the disaster and 
catastrophe event, making the long-term focus economic development or stabilization 
(Coppola 2011; OECD 2016). 
INGO Accountability and Transparency of Programs 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates over 36,000 INGOs 
are operating worldwide. The annual budget for the organizations, estimated by the 
Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tops $120 billion (USD) 
(Polman 2010). That figure does not include the billions of dollars collected by faith-
based organizations (FBOs) and not-for-profit organizations for relief and recovery. 
Therefore the economic scale is quite large (Polman 2010). 
Cuny (1983) views INGO accountability and efficacy as largely a mixed bag with 
considerable upside. INGOs, from his perspective, are successful at connecting aid relief 
to reconstruction. He focuses on the specific contexts of geography, politics, and culture 
of the affected nation state. Cuny suggests that an INGO possesses the ability and 
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capacity to identify the barriers potentially encountered within a theater. Also, INGOs 
can effectively route the best field staff to a particular event. The integration of an INGO 
and a local NGO or non-profit also allows for local disaster knowledge, resources, and a 
more efficient decentralized decision-making process.  
INGOs operate in challenging environments. Numerous issues plague INGOs in 
determining their success or failure in aid delivery. Chandra and Acosta (2009) address 
those challenges that take place during the integration of INGOs into the public sector 
disaster command structure. Specifically, they note that INGOs are unlikely to be 
successful when there is an inability to obtain clear mission assignments, a lack of secure 
funding streams to operate, an absence of operational coordination, and finally extensive 
duplication of efforts by other competing NGOs/INGOs. Chandra and Acosta (2009) 
attribute these challenges to inadequate policy and guidance from all levels of the public 
and private sector. They add that the literature is woefully unclear on guidance 
requirements for operations that follow catastrophe level events (Chandra and Acosta 
2009). 
INGOs have expanded exponentially since the 1960’s, just as donors have 
contributed billions of dollars for aid delivery following catastrophes (Cuny 1983; 
Ramachandran and Walz 2012). The rapid expansion of INGOs has created the need for 
transparency and accountability on source donations and program/project expenditures in 
aid delivery (Natsios 1995; Ramachandran and Walz 2012).  
Up to now, INGOs have been less than forthcoming regarding financial 
transparency. They do not provide data or evidence of independent or third party 
oversight for aid delivery following catastrophes (Buss and Gardner 2008; Bosch 2010; 
67 
Polman 2010; Moss 2011; Ramachandran and Walz 2012). The prior research on 
transparency predominately focuses on the most salient catastrophic events that have 
been located within the United States. However, research and publicly available data on 
INGO aid delivery outside of the US context have similarly been limited following 
catastrophic events (especially in developing countries). The lack of this type of data 
poses a significant issue to research on the success and failure of programs implemented 
by INGOs following catastrophe events. 
Recent fiscal scandals including INGOs have created a need for better 
accountability, transparency, and oversight. Ebrahim (2003) discusses this lack of 
transparency and monitoring of INGOs and ground the existing level of secrecy to past 
scandals, a general lack of trust, and the explosive growth of INGOs and competition for 
resources. Each of these elements affects the overall mission success of INGOs. Given 
the rising level of competition for resources, significant concerns have been generated on 
the exaggeration of response and recovery assessments of INGOs. 
To combat these tendencies for overstatement of results, Ebrahim (2003) argues 
for the establishment of greater levels of internal and external accountability. Regarding 
internal accountability, that concept covers the responsibility for INGOs to monitor 
individuals’ actions and their consistency with the organizational mission and vision 
(Ebrahim, 2003). External accountability, on the other hand, refers to INGOs obligations’ 
to meet broader standards within the disaster response and recovery industry. 
Ebrahim (2003) outlines five mechanisms to improve INGO standards. These include 
production and review of financial disclosure statements, the performance of program 
assessments and evaluations (often self-assessed by the NGO), participation in 
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international disaster response networks, higher standards of self-regulation based on 
industry accepted practices or standards, and social audits (Ebrahim 2003). 
 
CATASTROPHE RECOVERY – THE MAKING OF A MASTERPIECE 
 To this point, I have succinctly defined catastrophe and identified those elements 
that separate disasters from catastrophes. INGOs are now critical in the response and 
recovery to both types of events. These organizations provide immediate short-term relief 
to the impacted area and assist in long-term recovery through a variety of methods 
(Chandra and Acosta 2009). Many checklists and guides exist to aid these INGOs in the 
recovery process (UNDP 2010; Phillips 2016) Unfortunately, many of the actual 
programs implemented by INGOs may not lead to fruition and challenges of profiteering 
by scholars, and the media are emerging. These questions about INGO effectiveness stem 
in part from a lack of program data that when exists is not made public. The data that is 
publicly available tends to lack the validity associated with independent oversight 
(Ramachandran and Walz 2012). 
 To better understand these problems, I am going to conduct, a comparative 
analysis of the housing sector recovery associated with two otherwise similar 
catastrophes. The use of housing sector reconstruction as an assessment of recovery is a 
critical part of the literature (Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977; Bolin 1985; Oliver-Smith 
1990; Comerio 1997; Dynes 2002; Ramachandran and Walz 2012; Lindell 2013; Hooper 
2015). 
Specifically, I am looking at two INGOs within two separate catastrophes to 
determine what worked and what did not work – successful or unsuccessful INGO 
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activity. Viewed in the proper context, INGO efforts toward long-term housing 
reconstruction require extensive collaboration between governments, INGOs, and other 
local organizations. Thus it can act as a standard bearer for how well INGOs are 
performing under tough situations. Essentially, I am seeking to understand whether 
claims of INGO profiteering are legitimate or whether they represent a clear lack of 
success in inordinately difficult circumstances.  
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Figure 2.1 Collapsed Haiti Presidential Palace (Filter The Feed 2016  
71 
 
Figure 2.2 Haiti Housing Sector Damage (US Air Force 2011)  
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Figure 2.3 Haiti Government Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment by sector (PDNA 2010)  
73 
 
Figure 2.4 Haiti tent city aerial view in 2012 (CNN 2012)  
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Figure 2.5 Phases of Emergency Management (National Library of Medicine 2011)  
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Figure 2.6 Haiti tent city close up on living conditions (Sacramento Bee 2010)  
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In Chapter II, I classified the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a catastrophe that met the 
elements established by Quarantelli’s catastrophe model. Emergency management phases 
were examined and found to be social processes that are non-linear and overlapping 
temporally. As I reviewed the process of recovery, I found that local stakeholder 
involvement was necessary to define recovery goals and that their inclusion is crucial for 
successful recovery. While most of the 24-hour news cycle media focus on the 
humanitarian response and death tolls, there are numerous INGOs and other 
organizations working behind the scenes. The overarching goal is substantive recovery – 
long-term recovery – of the affected area, which means the context aesthetically is similar 
to pre-event conditions yet resilient and sustainable to the primary hazards and risks of 
the location. This section presents a systematic, comparative qualitative research design, 
with the use of most similar systems design, as well as the parallel case to the Haiti 
earthquake; the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. 
 
A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACH 
 Qualitative Disaster Research (QDR) roots itself in Prince’s (1920) study of the 
Halifax explosion (Scanlon 1997; Phillips 2014). Prince’s study involved the collision of 
two ships (one of which was carrying munitions) and the catastrophic explosion that 
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followed. This event was the beginning of social change research in disasters. Prince’s 
use of his personal observations, interviews, and records/documents over the period of 
two years produced a systematic and theoretically grounded study of the Halifax disaster. 
This research act as the seminal foundation of qualitative research methods in the study 
of disasters and recovery (Creswell 2013; Creswell 2014). The best formal definition of 
qualitative research is provided by Denzin and Lincoln, as “…a situated activity that 
locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive 
material practices that made the world visible.” (Denzin and Lincoln 2011:3). 
 QDR provides a broad range of data collection methods. This breadth is critical 
as most research designs and studies do not clearly tie into one particular method of study 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). QDR is a logical way to evaluate the uncertain and 
disrupted contexts found in disaster settings (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Phillips 
2014). Researchers in all fields of social and behavioral research (particularly 
anthropology) have applied qualitative methods to their research questions and gained a 
stronger understanding of the social process (Kalof, Dan, and Dietz 2008; Phillips 2014). 
 Disaster research came into existence in the early 1950s when the National 
Academy of Sciences and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) sent numerous 
researchers into the field. Phillips (2014) explains that these early roots emphasized 
qualitative research strategies that can measure challenging variables and operationalize 
research designs necessary to understand complex and chaotic disaster and catastrophe 
settings.  
 Typically, it is not possible to have a ready-made research design available for a 
particular event in some unknown area of the world. Thus the flexibility of qualitative 
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methodology is imperative. Also, lengthy-time-consuming data collection efforts 
necessary for quantitative research design is simply not possible in disaster settings. 
Efforts and resources typically go to the most critical needs of immediate response and 
short-term recovery, making systematic sampling and quantitative research much more 
challenging than normal settings. Clearly, quantitative and qualitative analysis have 
something to contribute to disaster research (Phillips 2014). Regardless of the method of 
study, the contribution to the field of study is key to the selection of the appropriate 
methodology (Rugg and Petrie 2007). 
 Qualitative disaster research allows the researcher to conduct and collect vivid, 
in-depth descriptions of the phenomenon studied. QDR enables the researcher to describe 
the social effects of disaster to the reader in a way not available in quantitative research 
(Phillips 2014; Patton 2015). In a simple analogy, the loss of a house can be reflected as a 
statistic or a numeral. However, in qualitative research, the researcher examines the 
social impact of the loss of the home on its residents. It can consider its meaning to them 
socially, psychologically, and emotionally. It can capture aspects of depth versus breadth 
within catastrophic impacts (Patton 2015). 
 Qualitative studies require rigor and transferability to maintain research validity. 
The rigor of study occurs in a multitude of methods, with the most common being data 
triangulation. Triangulation allows the researcher the ability to utilize data from multiple 
sources for the establishment of valid inferences and conclusions. Triangulation of data is 
invoked to check data validity and establish transferability (Patton 2015). A caveat, 
however, is that the researcher frequently ends up with more variables than valid data 
points (Patton 2015; Berg and Lune 2012). 
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COMPARATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 The comparative research design is found in political science as well as a variety 
of other disciplines, including social science and disaster research. The fundamental 
concept of comparative research design is the use contrast between two or more contexts, 
which furthers knowledge of systematic relationships found within the different settings. 
This method can be inductive (observation first) or deductive (theory-driven observation) 
in nature. This allows a systematic and methodical research design for the study of two 
nations or other units of analysis such as groups, institutions or events. The goal is to 
allow the researcher to identify and analyze specific patterns, themes, and circumstances 
with a focus on the dependent variable (what is sought to be explained) or independent 
(that which explains) variables (Anckar 2008). 
Ultimately, the comparative approach is useful to researchers that study questions 
associated with small sample sizes (n). That is the case in this study, where I am focusing 
on housing recovery from catastrophe in failed state environments, and I seek to 
understand the efficaciousness of INGO efforts. The unit of analysis is failed states with a 
catastrophe event – a number that thankfully is not that large.  
Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) 
The primary approaches to comparative design are Most Similar Systems Design 
(MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) (Anckar 2008). Most different 
systems design (MDSD) is the comparison of two or more cases with conflicting criteria 
and single common factor that can be thought of as the dependent variable. The method 
looks at alternative contexts that are as different as feasibly possible and then considers 
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the systematic effects of the common denominator where the contexts are similar. MDSD 
does not apply any strict or rigid rules for independent variable development. If 
differences are discovered during data collection, it does not provide an explanation as 
long as the similarity exists and its effects can be discerned (Anckar 2008). 
Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) 
 Most similar systems are the alternative comparative strategy, and it is more 
frequently used than most dissimilar strategies. It is a practical research design that seeks 
to determine the effects of a singular factor that exhibits variance in otherwise similar or 
consistent contexts. The dependent variable is the source of variance and can either be 
present or not present in the study or exhibit disparities in form. Extraneous variables are 
considered constant and thus are irrelevant to the observed variance of the dependent 
variable. The researcher seeks to determine whether outcomes are different by variance in 
the sampling factor (Anckar 2008). 
 Unfortunately, MSSD design is not a seamless technique - not all variables can be 
kept constant in most contexts. The research design literature provides two primary 
methods of MSSD, one of which is stricter than the other. The first allows the researcher 
the ability to choose the countries and phenomena to study. This allows the researcher to 
identify the control variables and focus strictly on the dependent variable during data 
collection. The second method is similar to the first but does not take into account a strict 
process or identification of control variables pre-data collection. No matter which 
research design the researcher chooses, MDSD or MSSD, there will be adverse 
consequences if the sample size is small and not all variables can be accounted for in the 
analysis (Anckar 2008). 
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This study utilizes an MSSD structure to evaluate systematic differences in INGO 
housing recovery effectiveness following catastrophic events. I use a layered comparative 
strategy wherein I identify two otherwise similar catastrophic events in failed state 
environments and then assess two different INGO recovery efforts in each context. This 
will help my perspective on whether the ARC effort in Haiti was generally effective but 
limited by the failed state environment. It also will provide me with some leverage on 
how different groups perform in these environments. 
 
COMPARATIVE LEVERAGE – THE 2004 INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE 
 The two cases presented in this study are going to be Haiti and Banda Aceh 
following catastrophic earthquake/earthquake-tsunami events. The primary criteria for 
this particular case selection were grounded in need to identify failed, or conflict state, 
environments that had experienced catastrophes that engendered an international 
response. For my thesis work, I selected the 2004 earthquake-tsunami that devastated 
Banda Aceh, Indonesia. 
 Banda Aceh, which is located on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia (see, Figure 
3.1) is part of the archipelago in Southeast Asia separating the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
It primarily is a flat land with rising mountain ranges as you move further inland (CIA 
World Book 2015) The archipelago consists of a group of 17,508 islands, of which 6,000 
are inhabited, including Banda Aceh. Indonesia is the largest of the isle states. Indonesia 
consists of 1,904,569 square miles, with 1,811,569 square miles of land and 93,000 
square miles of water. Land use in Indonesia is predominately agriculture. The coastlines 
encompass 54,716 square miles. (see, Figure 3.1) In comparison, Indonesia is 
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approximately three times smaller than the state of Texas but is the fourth most populated 
nation in the world. It contains thousands of acres of forest land; second only to the 
Amazon forest in Brazil, (CIA World Book 2015). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE] 
The Dutch colonized the Indonesia archipelago in the early 17th century. Japan ruled from 
1942 to 1945 but surrendered the archipelago shortly after the end of World War II. 
Indonesia claimed its independence after the surrender but was embroiled in internal 
conflict before the Netherlands allowed them to become a sovereign nation in 1949. 
Much like Haiti, Indonesia has a long history of corruption and conflict with the 
government with martial law being declared in 1957 (CIA World Book 2015).   
Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast Asia. The primary economic base is 
agriculture and industry. Examples of farm exports include rubber, meats, fish, cocoa, 
coffee, and indigenous spices and herbs. Examples of industrial exports include 
petroleum as the main export. Other industry exports include textiles, wearing apparel, 
including shoes, appliances, mining, building and construction material, and tourism 
(CIA World Book 2015). Indonesian island countries export to countries all across the 
globe. The primary beneficiaries of these exports are China, Japan, the United States, 
Singapore, India, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore. The annual exports of Indonesia 
in 2015 are estimated at 148.4 billion (USD) (CIA World Book 2015). 
 An attempted coup de taut in 1965 failed, and the President Soekarno remained in 
power. Due to external pressure, Soekarno was eventually ousted as leader and replaced 
by President Suharto from 1967 to 1988 before extreme rioting ended his presidency. The 
country remained in a state of turmoil and conflict until 1999 when free and fair elections 
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were first held. The current President, Joko Widodo, has been President since October 
2014 (CIA World Book 2015). 
Banda Aceh is at the center of an on-going conflict between rebel groups and the 
government in Jakarta. The conflict in Aceh Province began in 1976 after the Indonesian 
Government disregarded the economic interests of the Acehnese people regarding the 
export of natural resources – specifically regarding liquefied natural gas (LNG). Aceh 
declared their independence from Indonesia on December 4, 1976, resulting in a nearly 
three decades of conflict (Clarke et. al 2010). The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) trained 
fighters in Libya from 1976 to 1989. Over 600 rebel soldiers prepared to fight for Aceh’s 
independence, prompting the Indonesian Government to respond with military force to 
stop the resistance. The deadliest part of the conflict occurred between 1989 and 1998 
where an estimated 10,000 to 26,000 Acehnese died in the conflict, and over 1.4 million 
people were displaced (United Nations 2011). 
 In 1998 military operations scaled back, due to reversals of Indonesian 
governmental policies. This engendered a series of ceasefires that significantly reduced the 
number of skirmishes. However, in 1999, the Indonesian Government launched new 
military operations in Aceh Province to counter an insurgent stronghold (Clark et al. 2010). 
Numerous skirmishes interrupted occurred between 1991 and 2001 with GAM controlling 
nearly 60% of Aceh by early 2001. In January 2002, the Indonesian Government 
announced a special autonomous state for the Aceh Province and the implementation of 
Sharia Law (Clarke et al. 2010). This agreement ultimately failed, and the conflict resumed. 
 In 2004, the conflict was ongoing due to the failed peace accord in 2002. The 
decades-old conflict was over Aceh’s independence from the Government of Indonesia 
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(GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The conflict was heightened by the presence 
of Indonesian troops in Aceh and disputes over natural resources, resulting in numerous 
skirmishes following the failed agreement in 2002. Historically, the issue centered on an 
impoverished area, despite significant sources of natural resources in Aceh and a decent 
GDP attributed to the natural resource – primarily liquefied natural gas – weak Aceh 
Provincial leadership, and weak institutions/infrastructure. However, the earthquake and 
tsunami ended the conflict when a peace agreement was signed between GOI and GAM on 
August 15, 2005. Although, there was distrust between both parties the peace accords held 
and the conflicted area found common ground in recovery (da Silva 2010). 
Banda Aceh Natural Risk Profile 
Banda Aceh and Indonesia are prone to numerous hazards. The most prominent 
risk is volcanoes. The archipelago has 76 active volcanos, the most in the world. The 
hazard and risk assessment of Indonesia also includes seismic activity, floods, droughts, 
tsunamis, and forest fires. An important aspect of the natural hazard risk profile is the 
lack of awareness of earthquakes producing tsunamis. Many people living in the area do 
not recall the deadly earthquake and tsunami of 1907, which claimed numerous lives in 
the Aceh Province. This lack of awareness, along with poverty and 30 years of conflict in 
the Aceh Province led to the inordinate death toll from the 2004 earthquake-tsunami that 
is also known as the Boxing Day tsunami (Birnbaum et al. 2004; CIA World Book 2015). 
Indonesia is located along the interface between the India and Burma tectonic 
plates. This area is also known as the Sundra Trench (Disaster Emergency Committee 
2010). (see, Figure 3.2) At approximately 6:59 p.m. central standard time (CST) a Richter 
scale magnitude 9.1 to 9.3 earthquake occurred about 124 miles off the coast of Sumatra, 
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Indonesia. As a point of reference, the largest earthquake recorded on the Richter scale 
measured 9.4. to 9.6 and occurred off the coast of Chile, South America in May 1960. 
Seismologists believe the India tectonic plate slid underneath the Burma tectonic plate 
causing the shock, also known as a subduction, creating a megathrust fault (Birnbaum et 
al. 2004). (see, Figure 3.3) A megathrust fault is more likely to cause a devastating 
tsunami when compared to other tectonic plate shifting. During the tectonic plate 
movement, a rupture of approximately 745 to 807 miles occurred along the India-
Australian-Eurasian tectonic plate systems. This raised the seafloor by several meters 
creating a tsunami and catastrophe for many countries across the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans (Birnbaum et al. 2004; USGS 2004; USGS 2005). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.2, 3.3 AND 3.4 ABOUT HERE] 
The Indian Ocean earthquake affected areas over 3,728 miles away from the 
quake's epicenter. Seismologist modeled the earthquake and tsunami and believed the 
first wave arrived along the coastline of Sumatra within ½ hour of the quake. Based on 
computer modeling, scientists believe the first 403 miles that ruptured along the India-
Australian-Eurasian tectonic plates created the catastrophic tsunami (USGS 2004; USGS 
2005). The tsunami devastated the Aceh province coastline and as far inland as 1.8 to 3.1 
miles destroying, severely damaging, killing, or causing serious injury to the built, 
environment, and social conditions. Unfortunately, due to the amount of damage from the 
tsunami, there are limited means to distinguish the harm caused by the earthquake, and 
that generated a tsunami (Birnbaum et al. 2004). 
 On Sunday morning, December 26, 2004, shortly before 8:00 a.m. a 9.1 
magnitude earthquake, the largest to strike the area in nearly 40-years, struck off the 
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north coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The epicenter was approximately 155 miles south-
southeast of Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia. The quake occurred over a 10-minute 
period. The earthquake was the fourth strongest earthquake to affect the world since 1900 
and largest since the 1964 Alaska earthquake that affected Prince William Sound 
(BAPPENAS 2005; Clarke et. al 2010).  
 The earthquake occurred at a depth of approximately 19 miles, which is shallow 
comparable to Indonesia’s location to sea level. It thus created significant vertical motion 
in the Indian Ocean that created a devastating tsunami (BAPPENAS 2005). The rapid 
movement of the tsunami allowed it to reach coastal areas across the vast expanse of the 
Indian Ocean. The tsunami raced toward the Aceh Province arriving approximately 30 
minutes after the earthquake and left a cascading catastrophe event (Clarke et. al 2010; 
Birnbaum et al. 2004; and Bezebaruah 2013). In many places, seawater reached inland 
for nearly three miles (Clarke et al. 2010) The Indonesian Meteorology Department, 
Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisikia, estimated the tsunami traveled approximately 621 
miles in two hours that mean the speed of the tsunami was similar to the cruising speed of 
a commercial airliner (BAPPENAS 2005; Birnbaum et al. 2004).  
 Local buildings and structures are not built to withstand such a violent movement, 
and they collapsed trapping people under rubble and debris. Damage occurred to other 
infrastructure including mosques, hospitals, clinics, schools, and other governmental 
buildings (Clark et al. 2010). The northern portion of Sumatra, which includes the Aceh 
Province, sustained the direct impact from the earthquake and tsunami, which overlapped 
with the area of violent conflict (United Nations 2011). The death toll was highest in 
Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and Aceh Java. The estimated death count in the northern Aceh 
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Province was over 100,000 with an additional 12,000 persons reported missing. The 
tsunami killed nearly 170,000 people (approximately 70% were women) and displaced 
over 500,000 people in the Aceh Province alone (da Silva 2010; United Nations 2011). 
The Indonesia earthquake, along with the ensuing tsunami, produced the greatest loss of 
life and property damage in Indonesia since the eruption of the volcano Krakatoa in 1883 
(PDLA 2005). Five hundred thousand internally displaced persons were left in the wake 
of the event with over 250,000 houses either partially or wholly destroyed (PDLA 2005). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3.5 ABOUT HERE] 
The Banda Aceh Conflict and Catastrophe 
 The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami presented a catastrophic event in 
a country that was experiencing conflict between the Province of Banda Aceh and the 
Indonesian Government. This is a decades-old conflict between the Free Aceh 
Movement’s (GAM) and the Indonesian government. In December 2002, a Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement occurred between GAM and the Indonesian government. It lasted 
until May 2003 when the conflict resumed in earnest. This action was the largest military 
operation of the Indonesian Government since the invasion of Timor, in 1975. This 
operation involved nearly 60,000 Indonesian Government troops resulting in numerous 
conflicts and social dislocation in Aceh Province. The skirmishes continued until 
December 26, 2004, earthquake and subsequent tsunami (Clarke et. al 2010). 
 At the time of the tsunami, Indonesia had scaled back the martial law in an 
attempt to bring peace to the Aceh Province (The Consultant Group of Indonesia 2005). 
The conflict at that time was classified as low-intensity, but it had claimed approximately 
10,000 lives and destroyed critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in Aceh 
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Province. The subsequent earthquake-tsunami substantially exacerbated the 
vulnerabilities of citizens and degraded the environment. The resulting effect was that 
this area was at greater risk of landslide and flooding from environmental 
mismanagement. It also altered the coping strategies found within the population. Crime 
and corruption increased during the disbursement of relief aid. The intrastate conflict had 
already reduced the capacity of the government to provide essential services, and the 
catastrophe brought the situation to the brink of collapse (United Nations 2011). 
 Catastrophes can also have uniting effects that strengthen a country’s capacity 
for response in a shared recovery effort. Land use and capability issues become known, 
especially with worldwide media attention to these problems. That type of care can lead 
to better disaster mitigation strategies, appropriate coping techniques, and reduction in 
poverty. Disaster reduction strategies require innovation and creativity, along with the 
involvement of stakeholders from the local and international communities to achieve this 
type of success (United Nations 2011; Afnan and Burke 2005; Klitzsch 2014). 
 In the Aceh Province, the Indonesian Government protected the forested areas of 
conflict. The protection of environmental and natural resources during the conflict proved 
crucial to the degradation of the environment or loss of natural resources. This reduced 
the potential impact of logging activities, both legal and illegal. Post recovery, logging 
was allowed to begin again and therefore Aceh Province now faces greater future risks 
from landslides and flooding (United Nations 2011). 
 The 2004 earthquake-tsunami was a catalyst for peace. In January 2005, a crisis 
management initiative was developed in Helsinki to put an end to the conflict (Clark et al. 
2010). That initiative ultimately resulted in the signing of the Helsinki Peace Accord in 
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August 2005, resolving nearly thirty years of conflict between GAM and the Indonesian 
Government (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; United Nations 2011). Beardsley and 
McQuinn (2009) indicated the earthquake-tsunami was beneficial in that it limited the 
ability of both groups to pursue conflict. The presence of the international community 
during response and recovery provided the incentive for peace. The sustainability of 
peace, however, continues to rest on local provincial and governmental relations 
(Beardsley and McQuinn 2009). The stabilization of the conflict and Aceh Province can 
be seen in the free elections of December 2006. The economy also has stabilized, and 
Aceh is improving measures of political freedom in the region today (Clarke et al. 2010). 
 
INGOS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECOVERY EFFORTS 
 The INGO response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami was the largest 
international response to an event post-World War II. My INGO thesis focus is on the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Disaster 
Emergency Committee (DEC). The DEC is a United Kingdom collaboration of NGOs 
who provide catastrophe relief and long-term recovery. Some of the prominent members 




Data collection began with a broad search of databases, news articles, journal 
articles, texts, papers, reports, videos, and monographs on the 2010 Haiti earthquake and 
the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami. There was no differentiation between the 
search terminologies for the two case studies. As research progressed, the search 
narrowed to categories of data sources referencing INGOs, Haiti and Banda Aceh, 
preliminary damage assessments, sheltering, and reconstruction of the housing sector. 
The primary data sources for this research include, but are not limited to, archived data 
from national websites, primary documents prepared by international non-governmental 
organizations, on-line electronic news sites, still photographs, and video documentaries 
on the Haiti earthquake and Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami. Yin (2014) describes these 
sources, along with cultural and physical data, as primary sources of evidence for case 
study and comparative research. 
 Data collection occurred over several months, from January 2015 through 
August 2016. Data extrapolated from the publicly available data sources included: Haiti’s 
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the preliminary loss and damage 
assessment following the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. Data are also from 
INGOs, including the ARC, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), Disaster Emergency Committee (Indonesia), World Bank, the Tsunami 
Evaluation Committee (TEC), The Collaborative Group on Indonesia, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), Indonesian and Haitian governmental reports, reports 
from the United Nations (UN) contractors and subsidiaries, the Special Envoy to Haiti, 
and numerous bilateral and multilateral donor organizations. Data triangulation 
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application occurred where data sources allowed and were publicly available (Patton 
2015). Accessible public data from INGOs was limited in this research, as made 
numerous requests for direct data from INGOs (i.e. Special Envoy to Haiti, the Clinton 






























ANALYSIS – HAITI 
The research design for my study is comparing most similar systems following 
catastrophes. The intent of the study was to make observations and analyze the methods 
to determine their efficacy following the catastrophe. I break the analysis down into two 
separate chapters. Chapter four covers the 2010 Haiti earthquake and recovery efforts and 
methods used by INGOs. The chapter also introduces the criteria for analysis, which 
INGO leadership and collaboration between the affected government, housing design and 
construction – debris management, design/material sourcing, and local stakeholder 
engagement - and recovery completion and accountability in recovery. The focus of the 
chapter will be the work of the American Red Cross, program implementation, and cross 
sector collaboration with the Haitian government and other INGOs/NGOs operating in 
Haiti. The comparison INGO is the cooperation of the INGO Mission of Hope-Haiti and 





CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
Leadership and Collaboration 
 Leadership, coordination, and cooperation are crucial elements in all phases of 
emergency – catastrophe - management. The elements allow for the effective flow of 
information and reduce the duplication of efforts during all phases of emergency 
management, especially the critical phases of response and recovery. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, recovery requires relentless local leadership to drive the recovery and 
reconstruction process. A local leader provides the knowledge and skillset needed to 
communicate the definition of recovery and source the skilled laborers and materials to 
begin recovery. 
Unfortunately, leadership capacity following a catastrophe is often limited as 
potential leaders may be victims of the catastrophe – injured or killed – and unable to 
provide this necessary function (Quarantelli 1996). INGOs responding within the country 
are not involved in the local planning effort and are often ineffective upon arrival due to a 
lack of local leadership knowledge. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, local involvement by all 
stakeholders is an important part of the planning process for disasters and catastrophes.  
The lack of local leadership places the INGO recovery efforts in a quagmire. The 
challenge arises when Incident Action Plans (IAPs) are self-developed by INGO 
leadership with little to no input or integration into the government's internal recovery 
efforts. This includes local NGO recovery efforts and local stakeholder grass root efforts 
(Chandra and Acosta 2009). The self-developed IAP does not guarantee alignment with 
the government or the populace’s definition of recovery, which I determined to be a 
significant component of catastrophe recovery. Primarily, this is attributed to a lack of an 
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international policy or guidance on how INGOs integrate into the affected areas response 
and recovery team – government, NGOs, not for profits, contractors - when they arrive to 
provide assistance and communication of IAP objectives and tasks (Chandra and Acosta 
2009). 
Design and Construction 
Debris and site selection 
Debris and site selection are initial and crucial steps in the recovery – 
reconstruction – process. Catastrophes produce considerable amounts of debris requiring 
management and removal. This is part of the pre-disaster recovery planning and is often 
found in a jurisdiction’s debris management plan. Unfortunately, most debris 
management planning occurs after a catastrophe has occurred and the public is 
demanding action. Several obstacles are immediately apparent, in the absence of a waste 
management plan, 1) how to remove the rubble, 2) where to move the rubble – a safe and 
secure location not creating additional safety and health hazards, 3) what debris is re-
usable for repair or reconstruction efforts, 4) the long-term management and removal of 
debris that is not usable or hazardous to the populace (Philips 2016). 
Site selection is a secondary consideration in the recovery – reconstruction – 
process. The ability of government and INGOs to determine who owns land available for 
reconstruction is a difficult, labor intensive, and nearly impossible task in areas where 
land records are not efficiently maintained. The lack of land ownership (parcel 
identification as it is called in the United States) is required by the recovery leadership in 
obtaining the permissions needed to begin repairs, reconstruction, or relocation of 
damaged or destroyed neighborhoods (UNDP 2011; Phillips 2016). Also, there is a 
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primary need to maintain the area's culture and heritage in the recovery process and is 
imperative in the reconstruction and site selection process (Phillips 2016) 
Design and material sourcing 
Culturally acceptable design and material sourcing is imperative to the recovery 
process. As I mentioned in Chapter two, These complex decisions are best made pre-
event, but most jurisdictions do not provide planning on land tenure, land use, or 
relocation in the emergency operation plans. If no pre-plan exists, a site assessment and 
relocation plan is required to relocate the affected area. This increases cost and slows the 
recovery efforts, thus increasing public pressure on government leadership and 
organizations to do something (even if it is wrong). Subject matter experts (SMEs) and 
personnel involved in technical assistance sub-specialties can assist in all facets of site 
location to relocation (UNDP 2011). 
Regardless, a regional and whole community approach should involve all 
stakeholders in the relocation planning if it is pre- or post-event. The best institution to 
guide this process is the government, but as we have seen in Haiti, corruption and a failed 
state environments provide a weak foundation for recovery that often stalls. The delay 
and collapse of the recovery process are not necessarily due to a single variable but can 
be tied back to multiple variables associated with the failed state. 
Engagement with local stakeholders 
Recognizing the need for a pre-disaster recovery plan is a crucial step for all 
jurisdictions, domestically and internationally. The second step is identifying and 
coordinating local stakeholders into a recovery working group. All parties concerned 
require representation in the pre or post-catastrophe process. This particularly is the case 
for marginalized populations - elderly, impoverished, those with functional needs 
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(McEntire 2006; Phillips 2016). 
Recovery is a systematic social process. Local, national, and private stakeholders 
are involved in the planning process (Chandra and Acosta 2009). The post-disaster period 
brings about heightened emotions, and the need to do something is prevalent, providing 
the opportunity for hastily made and poor decisions (Brown et al. 2011; Phillips 2016). 
Completion and accountability 
Frederick C. Cuny (1983) viewed INGO accountability failure as an organizational 
response failure and success. His perspective of success is connecting aid relief to 
reconstruction. Cuny’s idea kept INGO aid-centric to survivors and the aid response as 
emergent. In his view, this accountability to the victims allows ownership and provides 
responsibility in self-recovery. In doing so, Cuny believes financial accountability and 
transparency will occur in the naturalistic setting (Cuny 1983). 
 Cuny (1983) focused on specific areas of understanding the contexts of geography, 
politics, and culture of the affected nation state. In doing so, the INGO possesses the ability 
and capacity to determine barriers potentially encountered once in the theater. INGOs can 
also determine the best field staff to the event. Integration with a local NGO or non-profit 
allows for local disaster knowledge, resources, and decisions made from the area, thus 
decentralizing the current decision-making process. An essential balanced and 
collaborative approach by INGOs is crucial for recovery and reconstruction efficacy (Cuny 
1983).  
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RED CROSS ANALYSIS – HAITI 
 The Haiti earthquake destroyed 105,000 houses and damaged 188,383 houses, with 
the hardest hit area around Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, and Leogane. Leogane was nearly 80% 
destroyed (PDNA 2010). Haiti has no public housing, so the damage estimate is limited to 
the private sector (PDNA 2010). The damage estimated in the housing sector is 
approximately $2,333,200,000 USD. An additional $739,000,000 (USD) is assessed for 
emergency and temporary sheltering needs for approximately 2.3 million internally 
displaced people (IDPs), including 302,000 homeless children (IFRC 2010; ARC 2010; 
ARC 2011). The catastrophe produced over 25 million tons of debris (ARC 2011).  
Applying Cuny’s concept seemed straightforward as I began my analysis. 
However, INGO transparency and accountability program data was difficult to discover 
and examine following the Haiti earthquake (Ramachandran and Walz 2012). Numerous 
requests were made to INGOs, via e-mail, for data to analyze on housing program 
reconstruction. I received no response from the large INGOs and quasi-governmental 
agencies I requested data from – Special Envoy to Haiti, American Red Cross, the Clinton 
Foundation, and the Haiti Relief Commission. If I received a response, it was the INGO 
was overworked and understaffed to provide me the data I was requesting. This information 
was essential for me to determine the efficacy of INGOs in their recovery and 
reconstruction program efforts in Haiti. The data located and analyzed was extrapolated 
from qualitative reports self-developed by the INGOs. I was able to find some complete 
data reports from INGOs who responded to the Haiti earthquake. However, they covered 
program areas unrelated to housing reconstruction programs. i.e. Christian Aid (2012) and 
Medicines Sans Frontieres (2012). 
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Leadership and Collaboration 
I found the IFRC, ARC, and partner agencies entered the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
response boldly with a solid western vision of recovery (IFRC 2010). The overarching 
goals of the IFRC and ARC in the first weeks following the quake were developing trust 
and rapport with the Haitian people. Aside from the short-term response, the ARC 
established and focused on INGO long-term recovery coordination, rebuilding damaged 
communities with housing repair and reconstruction, meeting the needs of vulnerable 
populations, and filling gaps in the response phase of the catastrophe (IFRC 2010).  
Many of the IDPs, with estimates as high as 263,000 persons, were migrating to 
the north and west of Port au Prince in search of food, water, and shelter following the 
earthquake. This migration added to aid delivery complexity (IFRC 2010). As of 
December 2015, 59,720 Haitians remain displaced representing approximately 14,679 
households (International Organization For Migration 2015). The remaining Haitian IDPs 
reside in 37 displacement sites consisting of a variety of construction. Roughly, 51% are 
in makeshift tent shelters, 3% are in other forms of transitional shelters (t-shelters) and 
tents, and 41% are using t-shelters as houses (International Organization For Migration 
2015). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE] 
 The IFRC and ARC arrived in Haiti and found the destruction and level of need to 
be overwhelming even for their large group capacity. They located tens of thousands of 
Haitian’s living in “flimsy” shelters that were not resistant to the hazard risk profile for 
the nation (IFRC 2010:7). The response from the international community was the largest 
response since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (IFRC 2010). United Nation’s Emergency 
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Relief Coordinator John Holmes said, “Despite the heroic efforts of many colleagues on 
the ground and the continuing efforts of all who are working to support them from 
outside the country, the magnitude of the disaster and the conditions in Haiti continue to 
pose enormous challenges” (IFRC 2010:7). Also, most of the donor aid was focused on 
Port au Prince – the populace center and most densely populated area in Haiti. This was 
despite the fact that the earthquake affected the Leogane area more severely. The damage 
to the capital was devastating, with 60% to 70% of housing infrastructure damaged or 
destroyed in certain districts (IFRC 2010). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE] 
 In Leogane, over 80% of the city was estimated to be damaged or destroyed. The 
areas, outside of Port au Prince, were found to be underserved by local NGOs and 
INGOs. The mass migration of Haitian’s from Port au Prince to the rural areas added to 
the underserving of the Haitian populace. This boded well for the IFRCs and ARCs 
concern about coordination and collaboration with other NGOs and INGOs in the 
country. The lack of coordination and cooperation led to a lack of inclusiveness of the 
Haitian people and self-developed IAPs by INGOs with little to no involvement of local 
stakeholders. Also, I found on-going power and communication outages hampered efforts 
of coordination and collaboration with the government and partner organizations (ARC 
2011). 
Design and Construction 
 Debris and site selection 
 The ARC and their partner organizations envisioned the building of core houses 
for 150,000 Haitian’s, with the ARC specifically responsible for 6,500 basic houses in 
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partnership with Habitat for Humanity (ARC 2011). These basic houses would be hazard 
resistant to Haiti’s natural hazards profile and provide access to clean drinking water and 
toilet facilities. Their approach was simplistic; they would repair or rebuild, build new 
houses when necessary, and use debris from the earthquake for repair and reconstruction. 
I was unable to locate a rebuilding plan for these basic houses. However, I found data in 
the ARC reports that a primary home was generally a transitional shelter, contrary to the 
western belief of basic home construction. Unfortunately, by early 2011 only 2,889 
basics houses were constructed aiding roughly 14,400 Haitians (ARC) 2011. 
 The ARC blamed their lack of success on land ownership conflicts and debris 
removal. I found that Haiti had an informal land title system before the earthquake and 
that the system suffered destruction of nearly all administrative buildings during the 
quake, leaving any vital records destroyed or illegible. Haiti lacked the essentials of a 
functioning society on property rights, and that lacuna brought the reconstruction effort to 
a virtual standstill for the INGOs and other aid organizations working on reconstruction 
(IFRC 2010). The INGOs indicated that the inability to obtain land ownership 
information, begin debris removal, and actively engage local stakeholders with the 
knowledge and skillset to rebuild was lacking. This was especially true when the ARC 
attempted to target those vulnerable local populations during the first year of the effort 
(ARC 2011). 
  Rubble and debris management were a significant issue in clearing 
building sites for reconstruction. The ARC indicated they were working with the 
Haitian government and local leaders to ameliorate the land ownership issue, but 
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a decimated governmental staff and limited landowner documentation caused 
substantial delay.   
 Design and material sourcing 
 One focus of the ARC was emergency sheltering and long-term housing 
solutions for Haitian IDPs. The ARC provided shelter kits, consisting of Tarpaulins 
(tarps), plastic sheeting, rope, tools, essential household supplies, and information on 
safety in emergency shelters to tens of thousands of people. The construction of these tent 
camps consisted of poorly constructed houses that often were located in hazardous areas, 
such as hillsides, slopes, and areas prone to flooding. Due to the severe damage from the 
earthquake and previous deforestation of the land, housing resource materials were in 
very short in supply. This required the ARC and their partner organizations to bring in 
requisite resources for the IDPs from other areas of the world.  
  The IFRCs temporary housing plan involved the construction of 
transitional shelters as a housing resolution for vulnerable populations – the 
elderly, ill, and orphaned children. The second focus was for families who owned 
and could prove ownership of land to construct transitional housing or live with a 
host family outside the affected area. The final vision was permanent housing for 
Haitians, restoring their lives to pre-catastrophe conditions.  
 The ARC proposed permanent structures, built with water and 
bathrooms; that would improve the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) component. 
The DRR relates to the two primary hazards Haiti faces, tropical cyclones and 
seismic activity. Also, these houses were designed so that they could be easily 
dismantled for relocation if it became necessary. This type of house would serve 
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approximately 150,000 Haitian citizens. However, due to the lack of local 
stakeholder input, the ARC decided the construction and options for the houses.  
Other housing could be repaired, if possible, or demolished and rebuilt on existing 
land or relocated to a new settlement outside of Port au Prince in a new 
community. The ARC estimated that 25% of the houses were repairable and 20% 
required demolition or major repair in Port au Prince. The reconstruction 
materials were primarily to consist of recycled rubble.  
 By the end of 2010, the ARC had spent approximately $221 million USD 
on sheltering and housing in Haiti, which accounted for 33% of the total donor-
funded aid (ARC 2011). The IFRC also provided assistance with cash grants to 
the host family to relieve the additional strain of housing IDPs. In all, 437,000 
households received housing to aid in the first six months following the quake, 
with the IFRC assisting 125,650 of these houses. (IFRC 2010). The housing aid 
totaled approximately $42,131,362 US dollars (USD) (IFRC 2010). A caveat to 
the extrapolated data is the lack of explanation of exactly what aid individuals or 
households received for housing. 
 Engagement with local stakeholders 
I found limited engagement of the ARC and their partners with local stakeholders. This 
limited the ARC and their partners from determining the local definition of recovery and 
what Haiti would look like following recovery. The INGOs were left with self-developed 
agendas on recovery, and they followed these agendas and the vision of their donors. This 
is counter to the lessons learned from the Indian Ocean catastrophe and recovery 
literature, thus hampering ARC and partner organization efficacy.  
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The IFRC blamed logistical and transportation issues as the primary reason for the 
lack of inclusiveness, as well troubles coordinating with other organizations. The INGOs 
quantify this by discussing the numerous meetings held on the mission and vision of 
recovery for Haiti. The INGOs also experienced linguistic barriers. Most Haitian’s and 
local NGOs spoke a different language than English and were unable to understand or 
communicate the INGO vision to the populace. This particularly was the case with the 
numerous INGO planning meetings, where objectives and tasks were developed for 
recovery (IFRC 2010).  
I found that the massive loss of life of the Haitian government leadership and 
impoverished country were significant hardships that were nearly impossible for INGOs 
to ameliorate during their recovery efforts. I could not find a specific ARC operational 
contingency plan to overcome the primary obstacles of poverty, except exorbitant 
donations from the international community, power outages, failed communications, and 
lack of national leadership. Instead, the IFRC elucidated the lack of coordination was a 
direct result of the lack of strategic leadership in operational decision-making by the 
Haitian government, local NGOs, and INGOs (IFRC 2010). 
 Completion and Accountability  
 IFRC Secretary General Becke Geleta said, “Disaster response is a 
sprint, but disaster recovery is a marathon” (IFRC 2011:17). The IFRC, along 
with their partners, devoted enormous resources to Haiti. Resource allocation was 
extensive and included a massive deployment of Emergency Response Units 
(ERUs) with four designated for sheltering/housing operations. These units 
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consist of highly specialized and trained personnel in disaster and catastrophe 
relief aid response (IFRC 2010). 
 The American Red Cross (ARC) raised over $488 million USDs in aid relief for 
Haiti in the days and weeks after the earthquake. A staggering $32 million USD was 
raised by short message system (SMS) text message, with 67% of donor funding 
delivered by the general public. During the first year, the ARC expended $245 million 
USD in relief aid to Haiti. ARC CEO Gail McGovern said the “Pace of recovery is slow” 
(ARC 2011:i). McGovern’s statement correlated with challenges in reconstruction the 
IFRC met with land ownership confirmation. Land ownership issues slowed rebuilding 
and pace of recovery for housing reconstruction for any organization (ARC 2011). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.3, 4.4 AND 4.5 ABOUT HERE] 
  By the end of 2011, expenditures increased to $330 million USD. The ARC 
shifted their efforts from a response and relief to rebuilding Haiti. Along with their 
partner agencies, 36,270 people received houses in 2011. The number of houses – 
although the exact definition of a house or home is unknown - provided by the ARC after 
the earthquake is 100,000 as of December 2011 (ARC 2012). Also, the ARC and partner 
organizations provided over 4 million (USD) in housing vouchers for “household goods” 
and for home repair (ARC 2011: 13). Data extrapolation came from a qualitative self-
assessment report written by the ARC. No expanded definitions were present for housing 
data to explain specific reconstruction or housing programs or what the received donor 
dollars funded (ARC 2012). It was impossible to determine the credibility and validity of 
data presented. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.6 ABOUT HERE] 
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 The ARC faced similar challenges in 2011. However, security problems and a 
Cholera outbreak in the fall of 2010 were difficulties that slowed construction and relief 
efforts. The construction that did occur was of basic houses (i.e., most likely transitional 
shelters versus the Western view of houses), the upgrade of houses built by other 
organizations working to rebuild Haiti, and the repairs to houses damaged by the quake 
(ARC 2012). 
 In 2012, the ARC continued the mission of repairing and reconstructing housing 
affected by the quake. The ARC indicates the reach of their aid is to four million 
Haitians, which is nearly half the total 2010 population of Haiti. The ARC provides the 
caveat, “Many of the people reached by the American Red Cross in Haiti received 
multiple services.” ARC Chief Executive Officer Gail McGovern stated in the report, 
“Recovery from such a devastating disaster takes time” (ARC 2013:i) The ARC report 
suggests Haitians received safer houses for their efforts. In context, it appeared the ARC 
committed to transitioning to long-term recovery (ARC 2013). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.7 AND 4.8 ABOUT HERE] 
 According to the ARC report, $126 million USD had been spent on housing and 
neighborhood revitalization. This donor funding expenditure helped construct houses, 
upgrade houses built by other organizations, and continue with the on-going repair efforts 
of houses damaged b the quake. The ARC suggests in the report they constructed 14,0000 
transitional and permanent houses, affecting 70,000 people in 2012. Also, they 
transitioned 20,000 IDPs from camp settlements by “subsidizing rent” (ARC 2013:2). 
Again, specific ARC program identification and information or details on donor funding 
expenditures were not provided in the report (ARC 2013). 
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 By 2014, I found the ARC indicating spending of 144 million (USD) for “housing 
and neighborhood recovery over the last four years” (ARC 2014:2). They suggest in their 
report that their efforts have placed 108,900 Haitian’s in safer housing. Unfortunately, the 
ARC does not elaborate on the specific meaning of housing or neighborhood recovery. 
Instead, I found they generalized their assessment by indicating they assisted in the 
upgrading of “transitional shelters to permanent houses” housing “tens of thousands of 
Haitians” (ARC 2014:2). Specifically, their report indicates the INGO has relocated 5,400 
families – consisting of 27,000 individuals – from the Capital City tent camps to long-term 
housing. During 2014, the ARC reported that 90% of the IDPs are back in their 
communities – no elaboration on the type of housing the IDPs are occupying – with 
172,000 Haitians remaining in tent camps. I found the generalizations of ARC housing 
programs troubling in determining the efficacy on a long-term housing recovery solution 
for Haitians with the lack of data provided or data extrapolated from their self-generated 
qualitative reports. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.9 AND 4.10 ABOUT HERE] 
 In 2015, the IFRC and ARC issued their final report on the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
response. The ARC report indicated they engaged with local stakeholders in the Carrefour-
Feuilles neighborhood of Port au Prince. They show that they learned from the stakeholders 
the reconstruction of houses in the neighborhood were “vital” (ARC 2015:3). The 2015 
report also indicates the IFRC/ARC reached 4.5 million Haitians – nearly half the 
population in 2010 – and 132,000 of those reached were through housing and neighborhood 
repair and reconstruction programs. The report indicates they have upgraded 15,000 
transitional or permanent houses with repair or reconstruction, as well as aiding 27,000 
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Haitians with rent subsidies (ARC 2015) However; no specific data was provided on what 
the ARC means “reached” in their qualitative report (ARC LAMIKA 2014:1). I found that 
the number of houses repaired or reconstructed by the ARC was suspect.   
[INSERT FIGURES 4.11 ABOUT HERE] 
MISSION OF HOPE – HAITI COLLABORATION 
Leadership and Collaboration 
 The Mission of Hope – Haiti (MOH) is a little INGO, located in headquarters in 
Cedar Park, Texas, and Titanyen, Haiti. MOH has been providing mission trips and 
program implementation annually, as individual groups, since 1972. The organization is a 
faith-based organization (FBO, with a vision consisting of five core resolutions. These 
resolutions include: 
• Relational proclamation: Love through relationship building, 
• Evangelical saturation: Spreading the word of God, 
• Indigenous mobilization: Developing Haiti national leaders to lead their recovery, 
• Holistic Transformation: Commitment from beginning to end, at all levels of 
recovery, 
• Excellent implementation: Responsible use of MOH and Haitian talent and 
resources. 
  
Formally founded in 1988 as an INGO, Mission of Hope Haiti has developed 
collaboration with many other organizations to bring recovery projects to Haiti over 
several decades. Examples of collaborative organizations, following the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, include 401 Bridge – a multi-year partnership, the National Football League, 
and New Story Charity – a two-year partnership. Their focus is faith-based, along with 
housing construction and improving the livelihoods of the Haitian people. MOH-Haiti 
completed three projects and was working on a fourth program at the time of this writing. 
Two of the four projects are related to housing reconstruction (MOH-Haiti 2016)  
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 Following the 2010 earthquake, MOH-Haiti has partnered with several 
organizations to reconstruct and develop communities in different areas of Haiti. Their 
goals were to move the Haitian IDPs from tent cities into permanent houses – block 
houses that are resistant to Haiti’s natural hazard risks. Through early 2016, MOH-Haiti 
and their partner organizations have constructed over 600 houses – described in detail in 
the following section – serving over 500 families and counting (MOH Haiti 2016). 
Design and Construction 
 Debris and site selection 
 MOH-Haiti does not provide detail on the debris removal process in their 
programs. However, their site selection process occurred through the Haiti Relief 
Commission (HRC) granting of land for home reconstruction. Due to MOH-Haiti’s 
response to Haiti for Hurricane Matthew, I was unable to gain further information on the 
exact methods of site selection or debris removal. However, the HRC was responsible for 
working to identify land through volunteer land donation and public areas for housing 
construction and debris removal (Special Envoy to Haiti 2012) 
 Design and material sourcing 
 The initial vision of MOH-Haiti was to construct 500 hazard resilient houses 
following the 2010 quake. They focused on hazard resilient construction of blockhouses 
with three rooms in their reconstruction programs implementation. Also, they developed 
a small plot of land for farming, a detached bathroom, fruit trees, and close access to 
essential services for Haitian families. The source of the material for the block 
construction was not located during my analysis. The cost of the original houses built in 
the community of Leveque was $6,000. 
115 
 The current project, as a result of the earthquake, is known as NFL Community 
at Bercy. This is a partnership between New Story Charity and NFL Player Elvis 
Dumervil. The vision is to construct 250 plus, block style, hazard resistant houses at the 
cost of $6,500. Similar to Leveque, the entire houses will have a small plot of land for 
farming and close access to essential services needed by Haitian families – church, food, 
water, medical, and other essential services required for survival. These finished 
communities will be Bercy and Labodrie Haiti. Hurricane Matthew has provided a 
challenge in this reconstruction program, but it is continuing as of this writing (MOH-
Haiti 2016). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.12 ABOUT HERE] 
 Engagement with local stakeholders 
 MOH-Haiti does not specifically identify how they identified local stakeholders 
to engage in Haiti. However, it is in the core vision and resolution statement. My 
historical analysis of FBOs indicates a normal engagement method is with a local FBO, 
NGO, or other organization. Since MOH-Haiti also has a headquarters in Haiti, this 
seems plausible due to established relationships and programs on-going throughout the 
year. Also, the immediate response to Hurricane Matthews destruction quantifies this 
statement (MOH Haiti 2016)  
Completion and Accountability  
 I e-mailed a personal communication to both INGOs on September 26, 2015. I 
received a response from Ms. Cammie McQuilkin, with MOH-Haiti, on September 30, 
2015. Ms. McQuilkin stated in her personal e-mail communication on their mission to 
Haiti, “Good Afternoon Corey, Mission of Hope Haiti has built a total of 520 homes to 
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date at six thousand dollars a home on average. If you have more questions, please let me 
know what would be the best time to call and a good phone number to reach you. I hope 
you have a great day. Cammie.”  
 I responded back via a personal communication via e-mail and thanked Ms. 
McQuilkin for her quick response on September 30, 2015. Ms. McQuilkin responded, via 
e-mail, on October 1, 2015, and indicated their INGOs development director for Haiti 
would be willing to speak and meet with me to discuss specific aspects of their housing 
sector reconstruction in Haiti. Ms. McQuilkin asked me to let her know when I would 
like to speak with their development director for Haiti. Through April 2016, MOH Haiti 
has constructed 615 hazard resilient houses and are currently working with New Story 
Charity and NFL Player Elvis Dumervil to build an additional 250 plus houses. This 
project is well underway, with over 50 houses constructed at the time of this writing 
(MOH Haiti 2016).  
 I was unable to obtain current numbers from MOH-Haiti due to their extensive 
involvement in response to Hurricane Matthew. However, my analysis revealed the 
houses they had constructed, following the quake, has withstood the impact of Hurricane 
Matthew with minimal damage. I was unable to get additional information on the 
progress of their mission in Haiti, although I know it continues with their recovery work 
from Hurricane Matthew (MOH-Haiti 2016). 
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THIRD PARTY EVIDENCE 
United Nations Evaluation Group – Haiti Response and Recovery Efforts 
In Haiti, several variables affected the donor and Haitian government relationship. 
The primary reason was the failed state and lack of trust of the government. INGOs were 
the first pass through for donor funding with 99% of the funds going to INGOs, charities, 
and private contractors. Only 1% of the initial donor funding was provided to the Haitian 
government. This lack of collaboration leads to an unsuccessful recovery response in the 
affected area. Ramachandran and Walz (2012) claim throughout the totality of the Haiti 
recovery effort, only 3% of donor aid was provided by the Haitian government (UNEG 
2010). 
Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti 
 The Special Envoy to Haiti was developed by the United States to provide 
oversight of the Haitian response, from the United States perspective, with an emphasis 
on accountability and transparency of donor program data (Special Envoy to Haiti 2011). 
Donor aid increased following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, nearly tripling from 2009 to 
2010 to $1.12 billion (USD). $1.42 million was committed or spent on aid relief, and 
$977 million was committed to reconstruction – development. The money disbursed 
primarily – 99% - was channeled through bilateral, multilateral, INGO, and unspecified 
recipients. Of these disbursements, 12% was channeled to the Haitian government and 
33% to support the public sector infrastructure. This report conflicts with the United 
Nations Evaluation Group and other literature on the disbursement and spending of funds 
on Haiti recovery programs. Given the conflicting information, it was difficult for me to 
determine INGO efficacy following the Haiti earthquake (Special Envoy to Haiti 2012). 
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United States Independent Evaluation Team Review of Haiti Response 
 Guha-Sapir et al. (2011) indicated 277,00 tarps, 37,000 tents, and 24,000 rolls of 
plastic were distributed to Haitians in the first four months following the quake. Through 
June of 2011, 47,500 transitional shelters were funded, however, by the end of June 2011, 
only 5,000 transitional houses had been constructed. Their report indicates the removal of 
debris – 25 million tons – and land ownership issues were the primary causes of delay in 
construction efforts. On debris removal, Guha-Sapir et al. indicate only 1% of the rubble 
had been removed as of June 2011, which poses a significant issue for Haiti to recover 
and home reconstruction to begin (US UET 2011). 
 IDPs were also estimated higher by Guha-Sapir’s (2011) report at 1.6 million 
people, including an estimated 661,000 IDPs who were migrating out of Port au Prince to 
find food, water, and shelter. Other IDPs were found in densely populated, spontaneous 
tent settlements in Port au Prince and 30% were found with host families in the Port au 
Prince area, placing enormous financial, physical, and financial strains on the host 
families (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). 
 The shelter cluster – the working group of partner organizations on housing IDPs 
– indicated that they were reaching 100,000 Haitians in the first four months following 
the quake. Specifically, funding was available for 96,504 transitional shelters, but only 
5,000 had been built by the end of June 2011. The primary reason cited was debris 
removal issues and the inability of INGOs to determine land ownership to begin repair or 




CONCLUSION ON INTEREST GROUP EFFICACY 
 The IFRC, ARC, and partner agencies began the Haiti earthquake response with 
humanitarian relief and long-term recovery plans. While on paper, the intervention and 
restoration plan appeared plausible and sustainable, the data is not available to make a 
complete assessment of the effectiveness of the programs implemented. However, I 
discovered, the IFRC, ARC, and partner agencies failed to understand the complexities of 
a failed state. This includes the ability to locate the IDPs that were migrating across the 
nation to find food, water, and shelter. Also, the INGOs did not anticipate the loss of 
government leadership and the level of corruption associated with the Haitian 
government. This led to the inability of the INGO to determine land ownership quickly 
enough to move from the sheltering stage to the permanent housing continuum outlined 
in general recovery plan templates (IFRC 2010). 
 The ARC raised over $488 million USDs in aid relief for Haiti following the 
earthquake. A staggering $32 million USD was raised by short message system (SMS) 
text message, with 67% of donor funding delivered by the general public (ARC 2013). 
The ARC report indicates they spent 100% of the donated funds on Haitian relief efforts 
in their final report in 2015. However, raw data, comprehensive strategic plans, and 
extrinsic analysis on the results of the funded programs are not publicly available. The 
only data located publicly were the self-assessments from the INGOs. As noted by Elliott 
and Sullivan (2015) the questions about whether the ARC constructed and repaired 
houses, how they classified repair and reconstructed houses, and the use of donor aid are 
legitimate lines of inquiry. Unfortunately, the lack of publicly available data only allows 
for supposition.  
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 While the failures of the IFRC, ARC, and their partner agencies in housing 
construction vision and planning are significant, it cannot rest entirely on the INGOs. The 
organizations did their best to provide relief to the Haitian people in a complex nation of 
corruption that were exposed to significant natural hazards. This can be quantified with 
the shelters and transitional housing given to the Haitian people, not to mention the 
immediate aid relief and medical care of the populace (ARC 2015).  
Therefore, I conclude the INGO long-term recovery failures can be attributed to 
multiple variables outside INGO control. The primary variables are a weak Haitian 
government – including those leaders killed and injured in the quake- weak institutions, 
the lack of INGO knowledge on the Haitian socio-economic climate, and communication 
difficulties about housing reconstruction with the Haitian people. 
The reliance on extrapolated data from qualitative INGO self-developed reports 
and independent groups in the conflict created confusion and frustration during the 
analysis process. I was unable to determine if the ARCs reconstruction methods and 
programs implemented were successful. The United States Government Accountability 
reports provided scattered data on the success of the US response to the Haiti earthquake. 
The report descriptions include mixed results, lack of transparency, and accountability of 
INGOs and partner organizations as the buzzwords of their reports on the USAID 
response to the Haiti earthquake (GAO 2011; GAO 2012; GAO 2013). 
Therefore, the ARC, IFRC, and partner INGOs were effective in their response 
and delivery of relief aid but were not successful in the long term recovery and 
reconstruction of the housing sector from my data analysis. This is due in part, to the 
failure of the simple land ownership system employed by the Haitian government, the 
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massive loss of life – including Haitian government leaders - and the inability of the 
INGOs to anticipate and provision for a contingency plan for unanticipated variables. The 
final and most influential factor in my research was the lack of requested and publicly 
available data for a thorough analysis of ARC programs following the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake (ARC 2015). 
To the contrary, Mission of Hope-Haiti has been successful in their recovery and 
reconstruction efforts in Haiti. Their core resolutions align with the global recovery 
templates and literature on the use of available labor pool skill sets, resources, and 
empowering the indigenous population to take ownership of their recovery. Following 
this method of empowerment, national leaders are developed that will assist Haiti in the 
future as they struggle with seismic and tropical storm hazards. Regardless of the lack of 
all data required, MOH-Haiti continues to provide reconstruction efforts in Haiti from the 
2010 quake, as well as damage caused by Hurricane Matthew which struck in 2016 
(MOH-Haiti 2016).  
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ANALYSIS – BANDA ACEH 
Chapter five covers the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and recovery 
efforts and methods used by INGOs. The criteria for analysis was developed and 
introduced in chapter 4 and will remain the same. The criteria for analysis are INGO 
leadership and collaboration between the affected government, housing design and 
construction – debris management, design/material sourcing, and local stakeholder 
engagement - and recovery completion and accountability in recovery. The focus of the 
chapter will be the work of the American Red Cross, program implementation, and cross 
sector collaboration with the Indonesian government – specifically Banda Aceh and other 
INGOs/NGOs. The comparison INGO is the cooperation of the Disaster Emergency 
Committee (DEC) – a conglomeration of INGOs from the United Kingdom and their 
partner organizations in the construction of houses following the earthquake and tsunami. 
 
RED CROSS ANALYSIS – BANDA ACEH 
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
approach to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and subsequent catastrophic tsunami was 
the largest single relief effort since World War II. Over five million people were affected, 
creating 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and damaging or destroying 
580,000 homes that equated to 1.48 billion or 32% of the housing sector (WHO 2013). 
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1670,000 persons were killed or reported missing, and 37% of the Banda Aceh 
population was killed or displaced (da Silva 2010; WHO 2013). Considering that most of 
the damage and deaths were located within two and a half miles of the coastline in Aceh 
Province (WHO 2013) those estimates are simply shocking. The overall objective of the 
IFRC effort was to improve the conditions for those living in the affected area through 
repair and reconstruction of damaged houses (IFRC 2011). The reconstruction process 
(see, Figure 5.1) provided new homes that were disaster resistant to the natural disaster 
risk profile (IFRC 2011). 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.1 AND 5.2 ABOUT HERE] 
Leadership and Collaboration 
 The IFRC established five core principles to guide their response to the Indian 
Ocean catastrophe. These principles guided the initial response and long-term recovery 
efforts, bringing success in all aspects of their activities in the affected area. The focus of 
the IFRC was on clear governance and management of the relief and long-term recovery 
process. An attempt was made to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all actors 
and the beneficiaries of aid (IFRC 2011).  
Organizational policies and guidelines were established and followed by all 
players to help limit confusion. The use of local volunteers and the youth of the area was 
instrumental in gaining, trust, rapport, and support for program development and 
implementation. Once volunteers/youth were involved the human resource management 
of all actors began with the use of subject matter experts and technical assistance when 
appropriate. The final focus was the mobilization of local and global financial institutions 
and the inventory of local resource available for projects. This was followed by global 
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sourcing strategies to acquire those missing materials for program implementation (IFRC 
2011). I found that these core principles aligned with the recovery continuum supported 
by recovery literature and it largely proved effective for the IFRC during the Indian 
Ocean earthquake and tsunami response. 
 The IFRC and ARC recognized the need for partnerships and worked closely with 
the troubled nation to develop those networks. Also, they partnered with other INGOs 
and private sector organizations to ensure collaborative efforts to reduce duplication. 
They understood that there was potential strength in partnerships. It increased community 
mobilization and the allocation of resources to acquire personnel and necessary materials. 
They also engaged commercial financial institutions operating in the region, as well as 
global institutions to develop grants, loans, and other financial needs for long-term 
recovery. These partnerships empowered local stakeholders and created a social 
mobilization that undergirds the IFRC and ARC termed the Movement (ARC 2006; ARC 
2009; IFRC 2011). This ultimately led to the quicker recovery of the area when compared 
to the Haiti earthquake. 
 While the partnerships were developing, coordination and collaboration were 
occurring at higher levels in the INGO hierarchy. The IFRC and ARC realized the need 
not only for operational coordination and but also for the development of a long-term 
strategic plan for recovery within the affected area. This clarified roles and 
responsibilities, and improved information sharing and communication about specific 
needs that were shared with partner organizations (ARC 2009). 
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Design and Construction 
 The IFRC initiated two specific models for repair and reconstruction in the areas 
affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean catastrophe. While the exact methodologies for 
construction were not contained in their qualitative reports, the fundamental concept was 
explained. The two concepts were donor-driven and owner driven repair or 
reconstruction. The donor driven concept involved the location of beneficiary homes by 
the jurisdictional government. Thus a relationship with the affected government was 
established within the process. The government identified the vulnerable populations and 
areas that were unsafe for reconstruction. In this case, the government relocated the 
neighborhoods to relocation sites to new areas that were vetted and selected for 
rebuilding. The IFRC provided the subject matter experts (SMEs) and technical 
assistance (TA) necessary for reconstruction of houses. The SMEs and TA were 
instrumental in conducting the careful planning required to build back better community 
layouts and to provide safer homes that were consistent with the nation’s natural hazard 
risk profile (e.g., flooding and drainage issues and seismic hazards). 
 The owner-driven process supported homeowners – beneficiaries – with the 
reconstruction of their homes. The IFRC named this the “Community Recovery and 
Reconstruction Partnership (CRRP)” and partnered with the United Nations Habitat 
program for the initial grant. It then acquired global assistance from the World Bank 
(IFRC 2011:9). This program provided grants, loans, and cash to beneficiaries to help 
reconstruct their homes. Critically, these beneficiaries remained in their communities and 
received valuable social support from their network of neighbors, friends, and family 
(IFRC 2011).  
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The CRRP assisted 15,000 families in affected areas (see, Figure 5.3) and was 
completed in 2010 (IFRC 2011). A caveat to this extrapolated data is that there was no 
country delineation on the assistance provided. It was also generalized to the region with 
specific mention of the four most affected areas. These areas were India, Indonesia, the 
Maldives, and Thailand (IFRC 2011). 
 The American Red Cross (ARC) supported over five million people in the areas 
affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. In collaboration with the IFRC and 
over 100 sister organizations, the ARC concentrated efforts on the nation states affected 
by the quake and tsunami – Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand (ARC 
2009). The ARC estimates that it assisted 650,000 people in the affected area and 
constructed 57,000 plus homes. Again, like the IFRC, the ARC generalized their 
construction information among the nations affected, thus limiting my ability to 
specifically identify which nation’s received specific long-term recovery reconstruction 
aid (ARC 2009). 
 The ARC followed the same methodology for reconstruction as the one 
established by the IFRC donor and owner driven construction. They referred to this as a 
grass roots initiative that involved networking with the affected governments and the 
beneficiaries of aid. The ARC claims this was not a new initiative, but one that was 
occurring before, during, and after the Indian Ocean catastrophe. The group was already 
operating in the affected areas and providing services, and those preexisting connections 
were extremely valuable in the relief and recovery effort (ARC 2009).  
The ARC claims they raised 3.1 billion Swiss Franc, with over 69% of the 
donations coming from the public (ARC 2009). The ARC priority was housing as they 
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viewed houses as financial assets and a resource for the beneficiaries. This aid assisted in 
the construction of 58,000 plus homes, which accounted for nearly 12% of the total 
housing needs of the affected areas in India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand (ARC 2009). As in the Haiti earthquake, the ARC stressed that “recovery is a 
marathon and not a sprint.” It would require years for the areas affected by the Indian 
Ocean catastrophe to recover (ARC 2009:6). 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Debris and site selection 
 The IFRC and ARC initiated cash for work programs to address debris 
management and clean-up. This program involved local stakeholders being put to work to 
earn a temporary income through the clearing of block roadways and drainage ditches 
and using debris for reconstruction when possible. This effort was necessary as it infused 
much-needed cash into local and national economies. The debris program cleared 13,000 
acres of land, 14 miles of roadway, and 15 miles of drainage ditches across the affected 
area. The IFRC implemented this program where the labor pool existed and was able to 
conduct the work. The IFRC claimed success for the effort, suggesting that it provided a 
cleaner environment, quicker construction of permanent and safer housing, and a cleaner 
environment (ARC 2006). The qualitative reports were generalized in their definition of 
the programs. Specific program data for each country could not be extrapolated from the 
reports I analyzed. 
 Design and material sourcing 
 Specifics on housing construction and material sourcing were not found in the 
IFRC or ARC data that I analyzed. However, given the large area affected, the 
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importation of materials was plausible to support these reconstruction efforts. If this is the 
case, logistical and transportation issues were likely encountered as the INGOs attempted 
to access the areas that sustained the most damage. The long-term recovery goal for the 
IFRC and ARC was the construction of 213,000 permanent homes across the affected 
area, which would involve the assistance of 1.8 million IDPs. The ARC use of the owner 
driven concept constructed 3,000 homes across the affected area and that supported 
15,000 IDPs (ARC 2006). As a caveat, there were extensive descriptions of the 
construction of temporary or transitional shelters that included what materials were used 
and the partnerships involved. Those accounts did not address where the materials were 
resourced (ARC 2006; ARC 2009; IFRC 2011). 
Completion and Accountability 
 The long-term recovery goal for the IFRC and ARC was the construction of 
213,000 permanent homes across the affected area that would assist 1.8 million IDPs. 
The ARC use of the owner driven concept constructed 3,000 homes across the affected 
area benefitting 15,000 IDPs (ARC 2006). As of 2006 and 2011, challenges remained for 
the IFRC and ARC in their recovery work. These challenges include a lack of permanent 
housing for IDPs, political uncertainties, and security concerns in a conflict area (ARC 
2006). 
 Regardless of the challenges, the IFRC, ARC, and their partner organizations 
have faced, they have constructed nearly 60,000 homes and reached over 4.8 million 
people affected by the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (ARC 2006; ARC 2009; 
IFRC 2011). This was made possible by the generous donations of the public. The ARC 
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received over 576 million dollars (USD), and the IFRC received 3.1 billion Swiss Francs. 
The ARC had committed 225.2 million of the dollars by the end of 2006 (ARC 2006). 
 Also, the IFRC and ARC remained accountable to the affected area, beneficiaries, 
host governments, donors, and other partners. The INGOs implemented a program where 
local stakeholders assisted to identify vulnerable populations who were in the most need 
of assistance. They also worked through their international secretariat on internal and 
external audits and shared this information with their stakeholders on their website – 
www.ifrc.org/tsunami - every six months. Also, the IFRC secretariat shared data with 
donors, beneficiaries, host governments, and other partners for collaborative analysis to 
determine efficacy (ARC 2009). 
 
DISASTER EMERGENCY COMMITTEE COLLABORATION 
Leadership and Collaboration 
 The Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) is a collaboration of United Kingdom 
INGOS. The participating INGOs were Action Aid, British Red Cross, CAFOOD UK, 
CARE International, Christian Aid, Concern, Help the Aged, Islamic Relief, Merlin, 
Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, Tearfund, and World Vision. These INGOs 
formulated a leadership and collaboration plan to aid in health services, humanitarian 
relief, and long-term housing reconstruction (da Silva 2010). However, following the 
Indian Ocean event, there was limited guidance on collaboration or a framework for 
reconstruction following such a large geographical catastrophe. Thus INGOs faced the 
monumental task of strategic planning and cooperation (da Silva 2010).  
Since the 2004 Indian Ocean catastrophe the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) has developed a field guide for disaster and catastrophe reconstruction. 
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This guide is known as the Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction After Disasters. 
The first guide was available in 2008 followed by Shelter After Natural Disasters: 
Transitional Settlements to Reconstruction in 2010 (da Silva 2010). The DEC learned 
during the Indian Ocean event that the engagement of local stakeholders, as well as the 
building local trust and rapport, were imperative for a successful recovery effort. This is 
an element of both UNDP documents (da Silva 2010; UNDP 2010) 
 The DEC began with a basic planning collaboration and an attempt to understand 
the socio-economic and conflict context of Aceh Province, their main area of focus. The 
initial plan called for a quantitative and qualitative damage assessment for a common 
operating picture for DEC leadership and strategic plan development. The second priority 
was to establish clear lines of governance and define roles and responsibilities to DEC 
member organizations. The final step was to secure funding for the mission objectives (da 
Silva 2010). Once the three basic tenants of response were established, the DEC began 
working on identifying the prospective beneficiaries of their aid, the method of 
assistance, potential partners, and plan development and implementation (da Silva 2010) 
Design and Construction 
 Debris and site selection 
 The DEC provided limited debris removal as part of their efforts in the recovery 
process. I found the tsunami produced approximately 141,259 tons of debris in Banda 
Aceh province. Most organizations used the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) Tsunami Recovery Waste Management program to manage debris in affected 
areas. This program managed debris and recycled usable debris to cover furniture, 
provide fuel for kilns at area businesses and homes, and rubble to build infrastructure – 
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roads (da Silva 2010). I found the IFRC and ARC methods of debris removal were more 
successful when compared to the efforts of the DEC. 
 Site selection was predominately the work of the Indonesian Government and 
Aceh Province. It was, however, a participatory process that involved local stakeholders 
and property owners. Most of the land ownership documents and site markers had been 
destroyed in the catastrophic event and were unavailable to the property owners. This left 
nearly 300,000 parcels of land in Banda Aceh without documentation on parcel 
ownership. The Indonesian Government, in collaboration with partner agencies, 
conducted site assessments and community mapping – with the use of Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS) – to determine parcel locations. The process was known as the 
Reconstruction Land Administration System and was aided by the World Bank. It was a 
community and local stakeholder-driven program with assistance from the government 
and outside organizations. It quickly gained community support and ensured landowners 
reclaimed their land. An example is women and orphans who may have a right to the 
land. In cases of disputes a mobile court was established to ensure the rights of the 
property owner were maintained. The mobile courts also assisted in keeping land values 
at a fair market value and the Indonesian Government assisted by adding 300,000 parcels 
of land to the process. These parcels are above the 300,000 parcels previously identified 
as being destroyed, thus resulting in 600,000 parcels of land available for reconstruction 
(da Salva 2010). 
 Design and material sourcing 
 The extreme damage and large geographical area affected resulted in most of the 
construction material coming from other regions of the world or materials recycled from 
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the debris. However, care was given to ensure that imported materials were conducive to 
the environment and culturally acceptable to the property owner. The property owners 
remaining on or near build sites made for a participatory process. This nearby locus 
helped to keep social systems intact and maintain the families as functional as possible. If 
the area was deemed unsafe for reconstruction, relocation was the only option but was 
considered a last resort for the partner INGOs and the Indonesian Government (da Silva 
2010). 
 The affected populace was provided a basic house design that complied with 
Banda Aceh Codes as well as the Sphere Standard (i.e., a global reconstruction standard). 
Each house required a minimum of 388 to 484 square foot plot and met each of the 
standards mentioned above. These plots may seem small compared to Western standards, 
but it was larger than most Acehnese people had before the catastrophe (see, Figure 5.4). 
Each house was required to be sufficient to house four to five family members. Not only 
were the houses larger, but they were built back safer. In the few instances when 
construction occurred in unsafe areas the rebuilding had taken place before strategic and 
operational planning (da Silva 2010). 
 Engagement with local stakeholders 
 The DEC was committed to the participation of those affected by the Indian 
Ocean event before implementing recovery efforts and reconstruction. Coordination took 
place between beneficiaries and the Indonesian Government in program development and 
during implementation. The participation of local stakeholders was at the heart of the 
recovery effort. They understood that strategic level recovery had to begin at the local 
level and that they needed trust, rapport, and ownership of the recovery process among 
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those affected in Banda Aceh. I found that they were successful at being in contact with 
those affected and maintaining open lines of communication. The groups appeared to be 
accountable to the beneficiaries and the host nation and generally seem transparent on 
their efforts. Before program implementation, each organization understood their 
strategic role in the recovery effort and the operational aspects of the plan. This can be 
seen through the houses that were selected and the metrics utilized to determine 
achievement (da Salva 2010). 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE] 
Completion and Accountability 
 The DEC and the Government of Indonesia both used the numbers of houses 
reconstructed as the metric of achievement. However, they attempted to incorporate 
context within their assessment. The context involved elements of the local understanding 
of socio-economic and political conditions. This was completed with the assistance of the 
Government of Indonesia and Aceh provincial leaders. 
The DEC collected approximately 382 million British Pounds with 7.42% of the 
funding for housing reconstruction in the Aceh Province. The programs were 
implemented and completed over a three-year period after the catastrophe. They 
constructed 13,700 houses from internal funding. An additional 6,200 houses were built 
from other fund sources resulting in nearly 20,000 houses reconstructed. I found that the 
DEC was effective in its methods of reconstruction, just as the IFRC and ARC had been. 
They developed a strategic plan and applied the plan to accomplish program 
implementation. This allowed for a successful recovery in the affected areas of Aceh 
Province.  
146 
THIRD PARTY EVIDENCE 
 Unlike Haiti, third party evidence was lacking for the Indian Ocean tsunami. 
However, I analyzed the United Nations Development Program report and the Disaster-
Conflict Interface and found some evidence of the elements of recovery that are 
imperative for recovery and reconstruction in Banda Aceh. While the earthquake and 
tsunami were not the end cause of peace between the GOI and GAM it acted as a catalyst 
deescalated the conflict. The participatory efforts by the INGOs to involve local 
stakeholders and the mantra of “doing no harm” during their recovery efforts was crucial 
(UNDP 2011). Some believe the peace accord increased the hazards and risk to Banda 
Aceh as it allowed new access to the forested areas of Aceh for materials that may lead to 
deforestation that creates future risks of enhanced flooding and landslides (UNDP 2011). 
I disagree with this assessment because land use planning and code enforcement was 
utilized within the Aceh Province. The effort resulted in the creation of the Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU). CPRU is responsible for a establishing a strategic 
approach to crisis prevention and holistic recovery in future disaster events. While the 
criminal element will always be present, the provincial government, as well as local 
stakeholders, working together may prevent this from coming to fruition like it has in 
Haiti.  
 
CONCLUSION ON INTEREST GROUP EFFICACY 
 I found the IFRC, ARC, and partner agencies successful in their recovery efforts 
in the affected areas. They began with a strategic and operational plan for program 
implementation and engaged local stakeholders in that process. This is essential to the 
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recovery effort, as literature clearly dictates. This can also be quantified in the difference 
between the two catastrophes. Haiti is still recovering, with limited reconstruction efforts, 
due to land ownership issues and the failed state environment. While in Indonesia, 
specifically, Banda Aceh, the government, and the GAM found a way to use the 
catastrophe to compromise for the betterment of Aceh. Although trust and overall peace 
were tensive within the first year, it was stable enough to allow an international response 
to conduct recovery and reconstruction efforts within most of the area affected. 
 The IFRC and ARC were less than forthcoming with specific program data in 
their qualitative reports; I found them to be trustworthy based on other literature and 
photographic evidence from Banda Aceh. However, like Haiti, the IFRC and ARC raw 
data, comprehensive strategic plans, or an extrinsic analysis on the results of the funded 
programs are not available publicly. The only data located publicly were the self-
assessments from the INGOs.  
 As mentioned in the Haiti analysis, the complete reliance on extrapolated data 
from qualitative INGO self-developed reports and independent groups are problematic. I 
found this to be frustrating as I conducted my analysis of both catastrophic events. 
Overall, I found the efforts of the IFRC, ARC, and partner INGOs were effective in their 
response and delivery of relief aid and housing recovery in Banda Aceh. Several similar 
impediments to recovery were encountered that were similar to Haiti. The difference I 
found was the involvement of the Indonesian Government and participatory process the 
INGOs engaged in Banda Aceh and other affected areas of the Indian Ocean catastrophe. 
I also concluded that the limited work conducted by the DEC in Banda Aceh 
successful, similar to that of the IFRC and ARC. The DEC entered the recovery process 
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with a strategic and operational plan that engaged local stakeholders and beneficiaries. 
They also involved the Indonesian Government in the recovery process and relied upon 
the host nation to take responsibility and ownership of their recovery. This was not found 
in the Haiti recovery efforts.  
Like Haiti, there are many variables I attribute to success, with the most important 
being the data publicly available for analysis. However, not all of the data I needed was 
available for analysis to determine and understand their overall level of success. The 
IFRC, ARC, and DEC followed the recovery continuum of self-empowerment, national 
leaders developed from participation that will assist Banda Aceh and the affected areas in 








Figure 5.2 ARC program expenditures and allocations through November 2006 (ARC 2006) 
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INGO EFFICACY IN CATASTROPIC SETTINGS 
 In Haiti, the IFRC, ARC, and MOH-Haiti initially were all effective. The IFRC and ARC 
were effective in short-term recovery and relief, during the response phase of emergency 
management. However, once they were faced with the monumental task of identifying land to 
underlie the reconstruction effort, they stumbled and never recovered. MOH-Haiti, who has a 
presence in Haiti, may have assisted in the initial response, but most of their work was in the 
long term recovery efforts of housing reconstruction. They were successful in their operations 
based on funding based on my analysis. I found no evidence in my analysis that indicated any of 
the three INGOs worked with or collaborated with the Haitian government. This is certainly due 
to the long tenured dependence on foreign aid and high levels of corruption in the failed state. 
Was one INGO efficient and the other INGO ineffective? 
 The comparative leverage of the recovery efforts following the Indian Ocean earthquake 
and tsunami was remarkable. It provided information necessary to understand the value of the 
pre-existing socio-economic and political climate. It also highlighted the need to engage local 
stakeholders and the critical role that the government plays in the recovery process from 
catastrophe. It also stressed the importance strategic and operational planning at the INGO level 
both regarding strategic and operational outcomes. The data available today, coupled with 
technology, allows all INGOs to develop response and recovery plans that are based upon a 
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nation's natural hazards risk profile. There is no reason this is not a policy recommendation we 
should strive to replicate. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH AND REFLEXIVITY 
 When clear and succinct rules and mission assignments are not provided to INGOs by a 
coherent local or international governmental organizations, then relief and recovery efforts are 
encumbered. The United Nations has four primary subsidiaries that share responsibility but at the 
same time lack the authority to implement policy. The creation of a coherent international authority 
with enforcement capabilities might reduce the duplication of efforts and aid appropriate recovery 
in failed state environments following catastrophe.  
 INGOs need to understand the context of the nation state they are responding to pre-
response. Contextually this includes cultural, social, economic, environmental, religious, and other 
factors unique to particular areas of the world. Collaborating with an in-country NGO or non-profit 
group can foster this effort. In conflict states, the INGOs must understand the dynamics of the 
conflict, as well as the capacities for peace to develop response strategies and ensure staff safety 
(UN 2011).  
 It is crucial for INGOs to develop appropriate strategic and operation response and 
recovery plans pre-disaster. The literature suggests the failure of the ARC to understand the 
context, including land tenure issues, attributed to its inability to accomplish their mission 
programs and projects. Efforts must be made to incorporate into the INGO strategic plan level 
accountability and transparency. That transparency should include not only donors but also 
beneficiaries, the public, host governments, and researchers. The current self-assessments are not 
meeting the objectives of these clients, yet we continue to donate to our charities of choice without 
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question. Innovative and creative ideas come out of the academic community that is systematic 
and potentially more efficient. However, the lack of raw data inhibits academic analysis and 
garners suspicion that INGOs have something to hide. 
 Cash for work and money for grants are one example of a prospective area for future 
research. These programs allow liquidity to flow into the affected community at its most critical 
point. Survivors go back to work, and it develops useful domestic resources. Depending on the 
complexity of the catastrophe, these types of efforts may be limited, and the importation of 
resources and technical assistance from the international community becomes necessary. 
Regardless, the quicker survivors can get back to work and improve their livelihoods in their 
affected community the more efficient and effective the recovery (da Silva 2010). 
 The lack of fieldwork was an obvious detriment to my research. It made it difficult to 
place the catastrophes and nation states into a clear context. I have not traveled to these areas of 
the world and lack the introspective needed to comprehend the various circumstances of each 
situation. It did not allow me to obtain the vivid, rich descriptions required of qualitative disaster 
research of the catastrophes with a social perspective. Archival and documents can only explain 
context to a certain extent. 
 I did learn that most large NGOs and INGOs data are insular organizations. They have no 
desire to provide raw data to the public or academic community. International NGOs did not 
respond to my official requests for raw data. I relied on qualitative, self-assessed narratives to 
extract what quantitative data were available within the sector metrics. The results, from my 
perspective, are less than stellar. However, the results show several areas of improvement. Of 
these, the need for ultimate accountability and transparency of INGOs is paramount for researchers 
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